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CONTRIBUTION TO AN EXPLICATION OF THE ACTIVITY OF
THE WARREN MAJORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT
MITCHELL FRANKLIN*
INTRODUCTION
rhe eminence of Chief Justice Warren, in his role of chief justice
the fluctuating majority of the so-called Warren court, is amply
justified. This majority struggled both to maintain the integrity of
the historic force of 18th- and 19th-century constitutional texts re-
lating to civil rights and to unfetter their explosive force, so that these
texts legitimately would determine problems as they have emerged
during the late 20th century. The majority thus confronted present-
day problems of civil rights without collapsing into the subjectivity
with which the anti-Warren faction of the same court opposed the
Warren majority.
In what may be called his political poetry, Hegel discussed the
"poison" which the fluctuating majority of the Warren court sought to
avoid.
The life of a people brings a fruit to maturity, for its activity
aims at actualizing its principle. But the fruit does not fall back into
the womb of the people which has produced and matured it. On the
contrary, it turns into a bitter drink for this people. The people can-
not abandon it, for it has an unquenchable thirst for it. But-imbibing
the drink is the drinker's destruction, yet, at the same time the rise of
a new principle.1
The importance of the struggle of the Warren majority to main-
tain and to unfetter the legal force of the texts of the Bill of Rights,
so far as the United States is concerned, and to negate the poison of
destroying, distorting, weakening civil rights within the American
bourgeois social order, has been stated by Marx: "The republic is the
* Professor emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo; professor emeritus,
Tulane University. A.B., Harvard University, 1922; J.D., 1925; S.J.D., 1928. I ack-
knowledge the criticism and advice of Mr. Jay Wishingrad, Mr. Terry DiFilippo and
my wife, Virginia, in the writing of this paper.
1. G. HE(EL, REASON IN HiSTORY 94-95 (Hartman transl. 1953).
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negation of alienation within alienation."'2 This implies that within
social regimes based on appropriation or alienation of work, such
alienation may be politically negated within the republic. This re-
publican, political negation is, of course, not yet the negation of the
appropriation of work. Elsewhere Marx said:
Political emancipation is indeed a great step forward. It is not, to
be sure, the final form of universal human emancipation, but it is
the final form within the prevailing order of things. It is obvious
that we are here talking about actual, practical emancipation.3
This means that the majority of the Warren court sought to maintain
and to develop civil rights legitimately within the bourgeois infra-
structure of bourgeois private property, that is, of bourgeois appro-
priative alienation.
Although this is a contradiction, the activity of the Warren ma-
jority was a tremendous accomplishment-and-was challenged by
the minority of the Warren court and by Nixon as president. Through
his appointments to the Supreme Court Nixon sought to overcome
the activity of the majority of the Warren court. In this sphere,
Nixon, whose ideology in general reflected the ideology of friend/foe
of the Nazi "crown jurist," Carl Schmitt,4 was inspired by the role of
Justice Frankfurter, the leader of the minority of the Warren court
which opposed the Warren majority. Philip Kurland wrote that "[o]n
the day after he nominated Warren E. Burger to be Chief Justice of
the United States, President Nixon asserted that in filling vacancies
on the high court he would look for those who could follow in the
judicial tradition of the late Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter." Simi-
larly, S. Sidney Ulmer wrote that
[i]n making his televised announcement on the nominations of Lewis
Powell and William Rehnquist for the seats on the Supreme Court,
Richard Nixon observed that he was merely fulfilling a campaign
promise. For, he said: . . . during my campaign for the Presidency,
I pledged to nominate to the Supreme Court individuals who shared
2. K. MARx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State, in THE WmTINOs or
THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 151, 176 (L. Easton & K. Guddat
ed. 1967) (emphasis in original).
3. K. MARx, On the Jewish Question, id. at 212, 227.
4. See Franklin, Further Considerations Relating to Romanist Infamy and the
American Constitutional Conception of Impeachment, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 29, 60-61
(1974).
5. P. KURLAND, MR. JUsTIcE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1971).
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my judicial philosophy which is basically a conservative philoso-
phy.... As a judicial conservative, I believe some Court decisions
have gone too far in the past in weakening the peace forces as
against the criminal forces m our society." In 1968, Mr. Nixon said:
"We need more strict constructionists on the highest court of the
United States. In my view, the duty of a Justice of the Supreme
Court is to interpret the law, not to make the law, and the men
I support will share that view."6
As will be suggested later in this paper, Mr. Nixon's theory of "strict
construction" is a theory which not only weakens the texts of the Bill
of Rights, especially the texts of the Second and Third Constitutions,
but, above all, condemns the legitimate struggle of the majority of the
Warren court to unfetter the particularism and possibilities of such
texts. This activity of the majority connotes dialectical struggle re-
lating to such particularism and possibilities of the constitutional
texts so as to achieve a unity-in-opposition of particular/general and
of actuality/possibility. Nixon's "strict constructionism" was directed
to exclude the dialectic or the explosive general force of constitutional
texts, although the struggle to achieve the dialectic or motion of the
constitution is inevitable or necessary because of the crisis or contra-
dictions within the social infrastructure. What ultimately was of con-
cern to the majority of the Warren court was the legitimacy of its
activity regarding the texts of the constitution and their explosive
force in liaison with what Hegel called "the interplay of ... forces."7
Hegel opposed his conception of the "interplay of . . .forces," here
the play of social forces, to opinion or what Nixon called legal or
juristic "interpretation." Hegel, in effect, condemned or subordinated
the role of such opinion solely within a division of social labor be-
cause such opinion connotes subjectivity." Indeed, Hegel wrote of
"subjective interpretation."9
There have been two great upsurges in recent America. The first
is the activity of the Warren majority to maintain and to develop the
6. Ulner, Supreme Court Justices as Strict and Not-so-Strict Constructionists,
8 LAw & SociTY Rxv. 13 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
7. G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 186 (2d ed. J. Baillie transl. 1931).
8. Id. at 213.
9. 1 G. HEGEL, TnE PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART 153 (F. Osmaston transl. 1920)
(emphasis omitted). In United States v. Nixon, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105-06 (1974),
Chief Justice Burger, although inspired by Nixon's idea of the role of legal or juristic
"interpretation," supported his position with Chief Justice Marshall's theory of "interpre-
tation" in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Granch) 137 (1803). See note 11 infra.
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Bill of Rights, so as to negate alienation within alienation, that is,
within the bourgeois social order. The second upsurge has emerged as
the universal successor or as heir of the Warren majority during the
struggle to assert the sacrosanctity of the impeachment power of the
Congress against President Nixon. While the latter matter is not rele-
vant to this paper, both activities are justified by the popular or "public
opinion state" consecrated by the first amendment, which legitimated
both the judiciary activity of the Warren majority and the sacrosanct
position of the Congress relative to the executive. Democratic veering
or dialectical motion as justified by the public opinion state may
mediate or dominate the ambiguity, irony, placement/displacement
of the structure of the first or Philadelphia Constitution, which con-
secratated separation of powers without, however, consecrating the
mediating power (the fourth power, so to speak). The mediating
power would establish hegemony within the ambiguous state.10 Hence
the three powers mentioned in the Constitution, each of which, in
essence, is an "interpreting" power, may struggle for the power to
mediate or to determine the hegemony among them. The first amend-
ment as a text of the Second Constitution or Bill of Rights determines
the validity of the placement/displacement of the mediating power
historically through public opinion, provided the public opinion is
itself unalienated or unappropriated. Because of the role of public
opinion in relation to the irony or ambiguity of the Philadelphia
text, it was possible to justify President Roosevelt's attack on the
Supreme Court and later to veer and justify the role of the majority
of the Warren court. This author has stated:
In Jeffersonian thought the power that must struggle through
the force of public opinion to gain the paramount place in the
state, so that its hegemony is recognized, and followed by the others,
it has been said, "is the power that at a given historical moment
will best defend the American people and their democratic and na-
tional attainments; and public opinion becomes a force in Jeffer-
sonian theory 'while the spirit of the people is up,' that is, while it is
active and ceases to be contemplative." This is justified by the hegem-
ony given to unalienated Public Opinion by the First Amend-
ment, the keystone, as Justice Black believes, of the Constitution,
because it dominates the formally ambiguous First or Montesquieuan
10. In the constitutional convention at Philadelphia, Gerry attacked the constitu-
tional projet because he desired a text with a "more mediating shape." See Franklin,
supra note 4, at 49.
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Constitution. This is fortified by the Encyclopidiste theory of the
republic, the authority of which is guaranteed by the First Constitu-
tion itself.
If this thought is rejected it means that the possibilities under
the First Constitution permanently become the exclusive property
of social forces which indeed were not strong enough 1787 to
formulate an unambiguous constitution consecrating their own power
exclusively. Said otherwise, the formally ambiguous First Constitu-
tion, dominated by the First Amendment, as consecrating the Pub-
lic Opinion State, indeed may reject or justify the power of the
Supreme Court."
I. THE WARREN MAJORITY AS A So-CALLED GENERATION COURT
Although the phrase "Warren court" has been widely accepted,
this is not an exact description of the historic mission of its varying
majority. The words "Warren court" suggest the idea of a generation
rupture or discontinuity in which the new generation represents a
negation, leap or destruction of an older generation. This is incorrect
11. Franklin, Influence of the AbbH de Mably and of Le Mercier de le Riviare on
American Constitutional Ideas Concerning the Republic and Judicial Review, in PER-
SPECTIVES OF LAw: ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOTT 96, 125 (R. Pound, E.
Griswold & A. Sutherland eds. 1964). On the basis of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and, article III, section 1, of the Constitution, Chief Justice
Burger in United States v. Nixon, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105-06 (1974), claimed the ex-
clusive mediating power for the Supreme Court because of a plenary power of inter-
pretation therein. This conception of the role of Marbury v. Madison is invalid. Article
III, section 2, of the Constitution is the important text. It reads: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution .... ." Of
Marbury v. Madison this writer said: "Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison,
turned this provision into one consecrating judicial supremacy, merely by the casual
device of omitting the phrase 'in Law and Equity' from his use of it. 'The judicial
power of the United States,' he wrote, 'is extended to all cases arising under the con-
stitution.'" Franklin, The judiciary State I, 2 NAT'L LAW. Gunmn Q. 244, 254 (1940).
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution merely justifies "private law" competence
under the Constitution because that is the most that "law and equity" meant in the
18th-century. See Franklin, Brutus the American Praetor, 15 TUlL. L. REv. 1, 18-19
(1940). The phrase "law and equity" may not explode into a conception of general
"public law" judicial supremacy under the Constitution because of the several particu-
laristic "public law" competences also created in article III, section 2, of the Constitu-
tion. The theory of judicial supremacy really derives from the idea of legal despotism
of the French Physiocrats which emerged in the decades before Marbury v. Madison.
See Franklin, Influence of the Abb de Mably and of Le Mercier de le Rivi~re on
American Constitutional Ideas Concerning the Republic and Judicial Review, supra at
102. This discussion leaves open the structural possibilities of struggle for judicial
supremacy created by the ambiguous or ironic structure of the First or Philadelphia
Constitution and mediated by the first amendment of the Second Constitution or Bill
of Rights.
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insofar as the new generation is also a social moment or dialectical
aspect of an existing social infrastructure and social superstructure.
"History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations,"
Marx and Engels wrote in The German Ideology, "each of which ex-
ploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed
down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand,
continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances
and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely
changed activity."' 2 Karlheinz Barck has described generation theory
as a
wide-spread theory of bourgeois literary-historical writing of the
twentieth century which periodizes and systematizes the objective
historical process according to the standard of its subjective bearer.
Its defenders have freshly arranged the question of the concept of
epochs with the links of history according to the succession of genera-
tions and have sought through the succession of generations to pre-
serve the loss of a unified picture of bourgeois history. The introduc-
tion of the concept of generations into the methodology of historical
and cultural sciences generally expresses the effort to expose his-
torical connections. This design remains planted in subjectivism be-
cause the factual historical contradictions and their class character
are masked and mystified through the decomposition of historical
periods into generation epochs and generation oppositions.' 3
Among the many generation theories and theorists, Karlheinz Barck
noted the German romantics, Ranke, Dilthey, surrdalisme, dadaismus,
futurismus, expressionismus, naturalismus, Cavaignac, Mannheim, Or-
tega y Gasset and Marias.14 He also mentioned the critical role of
Werner Kraus. 5 It is hardly necessary to say that American legal
theory has been infected by the theory of the succession of generations.
If history is the succession of generations, each of which exploits
the materials handed down to it in completely changed activity, it
does not follow that the change of activity is completely self-conscious.
This too is true of law which may be ideological in that it also may
be false or superstructural consciousness which determines the activ-
12. K. M.AIx & F. ENGELS, TnE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 60 (S. Ryazanskaya trans].
1964).
13. Barck, Generationstheorie, in 1 PHILOSOPHISCHES W6RT.RDUCH 396 (G.
Klaus & M. Buhr ed. 1970).
14. Id. at 397.
15. Id.
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ity of the jurist. In a manuscript on Feuerbach (which has been dis-
cussed by both Sfve and Althusser), Marx wrote:
[In the] law the bourgeois must give themselves a general ex-
pression precisely because they rule as a class . . . There is no
history of politics, law, science, etc., of art, religion, etc ..... Why
the ideologists turn everything up-side down.
For this ideological subdivision with a class, 1. The occupa-
tion assumes an independent existence owing to division of labour;
everyone believes his craft to be the true one. The very nature of
their craft causes them to succumb the more easily to illusions re-
garding the connection between their craft and reality. In their con-
sciousness, in jurisprudence, politics, etc., relationships become con-
cepts; since they do not go beyond these relationships, the concepts
of the relationships also become fixed concepts in their mind. The
judge, for example, applies the code, he therefore regards legisla-
tion as the real, active driving force....
Idea of justice, Idea of State. The matter is turned upside-
down in ordinary consciousness."
Thus, legal activity is not only a thing-in-and-for-itself, as super-
structure, but also a thing-for-other, the social infrastructure. Indeed,
as the truth of legal activity is also in its other-that is, as it also gets
its meaning in its infrastructural other-critics of the so-called Warren
majority of the Supreme Court, such as Bickel17 and Kurland,' may
be reproached if they have not also mastered the infrastructural reality
within which the so-called Warren majority made its determinations,
or if they have mystified the infrastructural otherness within which
those justices made their decisions. Both Bickel and Kurland invoke
the obscurantist, subjectivist, 19th-century philosophy of life of Justice
Frankfurter, a bourgeois movement which later fed many of the re-
actionary philosophical idealisms of the 20th-century, including existen-
tialism and pragmatism. Bickel sums up Frankfurter's thought thus:
Better to recognize candidly that judicial judgment was statesman-
ship superimposed on the democratic political process, and its final
test was the future. So Frankfurter taught. The judge, he wrote in
1954-albeit extra-judicially, not in an opinion-had to be historian,
16. K. MARx & F. ENGELS, supra note 12, at 671-72.
17. See A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
18. See P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT
(1970).
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philosopher, and prophet. Even though ill equipped to do so (the
task requires "poetic sensibilities" and the "gift of imagination"), he
must "pierce the curtain of the future . . . give shape and visage to
mysteries still in the womb of time." He must "have antennae
registering feeling and judgment beyond logical, let alone quantita-
tive, proof."
Speaking generally, therefore, and reserving judgment on the
validity, wisdom and worth of various judicial judgments, one can
hardly tax Frankfurter's younger colleagues and his successors for
seeing themselves in the role of statesmen, discharging a responsi-
bility for the progress of society. It was their fate, wished on them
by the great men, chief among them, over a career of fifty years,
Felix Frankfurter, who gave us an age of reason in American law,
who disestablished an old faith and made room for a new.
19
Kurland tells of the outcome of Frankfurter's new rationalism or ir-
rational rationalism, by noting that the "strict constructionists" now
look upon Felix Frankfurter as a "hero, though he was once regarded
with somewhat less esteem by these same people. '20
As indicated through Nixon, there seems to be an identity be-
tween the poetry of Justice Frankfurter and the prose of the "strict
constructionists" who seek to undo the accomplishments of the ma-
jority of the so-called Warren court. "Strict constructionism" today
does not mean merely the strict constructionism of the pre-civil war
southern slaveholders (though the racist demagoguery is obviously
intended), but also the general negation of the texts of the formulated
constitution which erupted and became a social force during the re-
gime of Chief Justice Warren after having been narcotized in varying
degrees and situations for almost two centuries. Above all, the at-
tacks of Bickel and Kurland on the majority of the so-called Warren
court are attacks on new constitutional forces that have been un-
leashed, especially by Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Con-
necticut.2' Here Justice Douglas preserved fidelity to the particularism
of the texts of the Bill of Rights; but reflecting the analogical method
of Roman law justified by the 18th-century ninth amendment, he
burst the fetters of particularism and legitimated textually a disci-
plined new general legal conception appropriate to the 20th-century.
This eruption of the ninth amendment was grounded in the dialectic
19. A. BIcKEL, supra note 17, at 38-39.
20. P. KuRLA~m, supra note 18, at xv.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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of the unity-in-opposition of particular/general, and of actuality/pos-
sibility. However, philosophy of life and its impending American de-
velopment into legal existentialism and legal Freudian-existentialism
turn away from the objectivity of dialectic to the arbitrariness of sub-
jectivity. Hence there exists today hostility, both academic and polit-
ical, to the qualitatively new type of constitutional struggle intro-
duced by the Warren majority, which in certain situations both accepts
and yet negates the barrier or limit in the constitutional text.
Mention has already been made of Hegel's dialectic of the inter-
play of forces. 22 The social interplay of forces released or exploded
through the text of the ninth amendment reflects methodologically the
legal Romanism of the ninth amendment. This is the role of Justice
Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. In 1958 this writer
said:
It is the mission of the Ninth Amendment not only to prevent
the weakening of the Second Constitution, but to provide for the
development of such texts to control historically new situations. It
is not therefore a text. consecrating natural rights without content,
natural law with a variable content; but it is a text of juridical
method. It is a text concerning the judiciary power. This differen-
tiates the Ninth from the Tenth Amendment.
But as the Ninth Amendment is formulated under Encyclo-
pediste domination, it reflects the hostility of the Enlightenment
toward the legal method of historically reprobated English feudal
common law, which is antagonistic to formulated law, which up-
holds stare decisis in its various manifestations, which examines codi-
fied law narrowly and suspiciously, and which turns aside from and
ignores the written text when the latter spends its immediate force.
However, in place of such legal method of the feudal English com-
mon law, it is the mission of the Ninth Amendment to require and
to justify the legal method of the Enlightenment, which here seized
the legal method of the Roman law. Roman law, as it had its out-
come in the great civil codes of the eighteenth century, may employ
formulated law by analogy to control the determination of histor-
ically novel problems, thus acknowledging historical development
without justifying a new arbitrariness in such development.
The great role of the Ninth Amendment thus becomes clearer.
It requires consistent judicial development of the first eight amend-
ments to control novel situations which are not immediately subject
to the Second Constitution. It recognizes the general constitutional
force of the first eight amendments, and makes them sources of con-
22. See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
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stitutional law. It breaks any particularism in the first eight amend-
ments. Thus, it excludes a counter-constitution or a paraconsttution. 23
In his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas showed
mastery of important Romanist discriminations relative to the Ro-
manist methodology of analogy, which justify struggle to realize pos-
sibilities implicit in the Bill of Rights. This is the distinction between
Rechtsanalogie and Gesetzesanalogie. This author has said, in discuss-
ing Griswold v. Connecticut:
What Justice Douglas described a "emanations" and "penum-
bras" from texts of the Bill of Rights or Second Constitution is the
process of determination by the analogy of such texts .... If Justice
Douglas had invoked an analogy from a particular text of the Sec-
ond Constitution this would be called Gesetzesanalogie, that is,
analogy of a law. But because he invoked an analogy from a group
of texts of the Second Constitution, Justice Douglas' opinion . . . is
founded on Rechtsanalogie, that is, on analogy of the law. In texts
of international law Rechtsanalogie may perhaps be described in
English as "general principles of law." What Justice Douglas de-
scribed as "penumbras" and "emanations" in 1965 in Griswold v.
Connecticut, because he invoked Rechtsanalogie, he described as
"analogy" in 1951 in his dissent in Dennis v. United States, where
he was concerned with Gesetzesanalogie.24
The writer added:
[T]he Ninth Amendment... defends and deepens the force of the
Second Constitution. And it prepares the way for the juridical
method of the Third Constitution, conceived as an historical text
of the Civil War.
Although Justice Douglas is not a Romanist or a civilian,
it may be observed that historical necessity has forced him toward
the civil law and away from Anglo-American common law.2
Similarly, in discussing the texts of the Uniform Commercial
Code, this writer stated:
In modern Roman or civil law a distinction is made between the
analogical possibility of a text having the force of law (Gesetzesana-
23. Franklin, The Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Third Constitution, 4 How. L.J. 170, 176-77 (1958).
24. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implications
for Republican Form of Government, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487, 491 (1966) (footnotes
omitted).
25. Id. at 491-92.
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logie) and the analogical possibility of a principle derived from and
discovered in a plurality of texts having the force of law (Rechtsana-
logie). For instance, Wolff says that from Articles 367, 371, 456,
468, 824, 916, 1026, and 1050 of the Austrian civil code, together
with other texts, a basic general principle, relating to the protection
of third persons who in good faith have given their confidence
to an external state of affairs, has been derived and has been given
general application. What Wolff treats as a basic concept was de-
veloped from the indicated group of particular articles of the
Austrian civil code.28
Karl Llewellyn, the redactor of the Uniform Commercial Code,
was aware of Romanist methodological conceptions. The Romanist
methodology justified by the ninth amendment and by the Uniform
Commercial Code are parallel. In law books loosely written for Anglo-
American legal practice and students, the Romanist methodology of
the Code as appreciated by Llewellyn, becomes disguised. Thus in one
such work the following appears:
In order to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices the drafting philosophy of the Code was: open-ended draft-
ing, with room for courts to move in and readjust over the decades.
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 183 note 186 (1960).
Thus, in the main, the Code was not drafted in the manner a con-
veyancer would. Llewellyn called these persons: "The metes and
bounds boys." Or, as Comment 1 to Section 1-102 states:
"This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is in-
tended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide
its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is in-
tended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circum-
stances and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act
requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its
reason."
27
In the thought of H. L. A. Hart the problem of legal analogy
is presented obscurely and free from any sense of dialectic. In The
Concept of Law, Hart stated:
All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as in-
stances of general terms, and in the case of everything which we are
26. Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 330, 338 (1951).
27. B. STONE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL 6 (1975).
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prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central
cases, where it certainly applies and others where there are reasons
for both asserting and denying that it applies. Nothing can eliminate
this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt when
we are engaged in bringing particular situations under general
rules.28
Later Hart wrote:
Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the
communication of standards of behaviour, these . . . will, at some
point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate;
they will have what has been termed an open texture. So far we
have presented this, in the case of legislation, as a general feature
of human language; uncertainty at the borderline is the price to
be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of com-
munication concerning matters of fact. . . . It is, however, impor-
tant to appreciate why, apart from this dependence on language as
it actually is, with its characteristics of open texture, we should not
cherish, even as an ideal, the conception of a rule so detailed that
the question whether it applied or not to a particular case was al-
ways settled in advance, and never involved, at the point of actual
application, a fresh choice between open alternatives. Put shortly,
the reason is that the necessity for such choice is thrust upon us be-
cause we are men, not gods.29
Thus Hart justifies the Kantian jurist who, as unhistoric, external
mediator, chooses among antinomies. Because "God is dead," men
are gods. What Mr. Wishingrad has said of Justice Frankfurter be-
comes pertinent:
Holmes is perceived as being "outside of history." But, since
"detachment" achieved by Frankfurter was a conscious act of will,
not a character trait, he was even more susceptible to Hegel's attack
on the subjective elevating alternately one or the other of the Kan-
tian antinomies. In this regard, it might be suggested that Frank-
furter in a negative sense, transcended Holmes' ambiguity and
achieved "hypocrisy."3 0
The struggle relative to the methodological career of the ninth
amendment has already begun, with the Burger court taking the initia-
28. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (1961).
29. Id. at 124-25.
30. J. Wishingrad, Oliver Wendell Holmes: Common Law Realist and "Un-
historic Prince," January 28, 1974 (unpublished manuscript on file at Buffalo Law Review
office) at 19.
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tive to weaken it. This is the purport of Roe v. Wade.3 1 Of this case
Wishingrad wrote:
The strongest attack, however, was to come in Roe v. Wade.
Even though Blackmun writing the majority opinion found that a
woman's right to an abortion was a right of privacy recognized by
the Constitution his methodological analysis was virtually non-exis-
tent. Blackmun felt the right of privacy was founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept, of personal liberty; but he was willing
to admit that it might be found in the Ninth Amendment also. This
cavalier attitude toward methodology was appalling. 32
II. ON THE "DETERRORIZATION" MISSION OF THE WARREN MAJORITY
An important mission of the Warren majority was that of the
"deterrorization" of American bourgeois society. Although Bickel
and Kurland believe the Justices to have been confused, uncertain,
irresponsible and perhaps reckless, their determinations acquire mean-
ing because they, in part, have been directed, through the Constitution,
against such bourgeois terrorism. It is not necessary to document the
actuality of bourgeois terrorism.
Neubert wrote:
The form of practice of domination can be of different types. With
the bourgeoisie it is terroristic as well as formal-democratic. The
form of domination is dependent on the historic situation of capital-
ism as well as on the class relations within and without actual states.
With state-monopoly capitalism the tendency to further withdrawal
of formal-democratic forms of domination grows, in connection with
which attempts to establish authoritarian or open dictatorial forms
of domination become cunningly veiled.33
Hence terror is a wider concept than violence, though violence
too is an immediate form of terror. For the moment it is not neces-
sary to distinguish Hegel's concept of fear from the concept of dread, as
Heidegger does. Terror is a form of domination grounded in the
dread of loss of being or the dread of nothingness, of the terrorized
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. J. Wishingrad, supra note 30, at 23.
33. Neubert, Herrschaft, in WORTERBUCH DER MARxisTIscI-i-LENINISTISCHEN
SOZIOLOGIE 184, 185 (W. Eichhorn I ed. 1969).
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social force exercised by the terrorist social force. Such coercion may
be the dread of physical death. In its veiled, refined form the dread
may be of loss of social relations. As humanity is human only through
social relations, dread of the deprivation of such relations is dread of
social nothingness or death itself. Sartre stated:
Thus Hegel's brilliant intuition is to make me depend on the Other
in my being. I am, he said, a being for-itself which is for-itself only
through another. Therefore, the Other penetrates me to the heart.
I can not doubt him without doubting myself since "self-conscious-
ness is real only in so far as it recognizes its echo (and its reflec-
tion) in another." . . . [I]n my essential being I depend on the essen-
tial being of the Other, and instead of holding that my being-for-
myself is opposed to my being-for-others, I find that being-for-others
appears as a necessary condition for my being-for-myself. 34
During the period before the French revolution it was not un-
usual for condemnation of feudalism to take the form of the criticism
of a state or period other than one's own. Perhaps Hegel continued
this mode of criticism into his own period. What Hegel said of fear
among "orientals" may be repeated here as the truth of social fear in
all regimes founded on appropriative alienation. That is, in the east
there can but be the relation of lord and slave, and in this despotic
sphere fear constitutes the ruling category. . . . This sensation of
negation, that something cannot last, is just fear as distinguished
from freedom which does not consist in being finite but in being
for itself, and this cannot be laid hold of.35
Hegel himself makes the fear or terror of the oppressed the centre
of the dialectic of oppressor/oppressed, which he pursues virtually
exclusively as the history of European appropriative alienation in The
Phenomenology of Mind. Here, however, the forces struggle recip-
rocally so that the dialectic of domination/dominated involves a ter-
roristic relation of struggle to negate the negativity of the social death
of appropriation. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, where
he wrote of the "East," Hegel said:
The man who lives in fear, and he who rules over men through fear,
both stand upon the same platform; the difference between them is
34. J.-P. SARTaa, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 237-38 (H. Barnes transl. 1956)
(emphasis in original).
35. 1 G. HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY Or PHILOSOPHY 96 (E. Haldane
transl. 1892).
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only in the greater power of will which can go forth to sacrifice
all that is finite for some particular end. The despot brings about
what his caprice directs, including certainly what is good, not as
law, but as arbitrary will: the passive will, like that of slavery, is
converted into the active energy of will, which will, however, is
arbitrary still.3 6
Moreover, in Hegel's considerations in The Phenomenology of Mind
the terror becomes veiled and assumes various historic forms, includ-
ing terror veiled by flattery3 7 of the appropriated social force. The
theory of the rule of law is such a veil or masking, in so far as it justi-
fies appropriative alienation. This will be discussed later in connec-
tion with Kant's categorical imperative.
What has been said permits this essay to focus on the historic mis-
sion of the majority of the Warren court. That mission was the "de-
terrorization," so far as possible, of American bourgeois social relations
-which are based on appropriative alienation-through the constitu-
tional texts of the Bill of Rights and the expansive or explosive effect
thereof legitimated by the ninth amendment. It must be repeated that
the Warren majority sought to deterrorize bourgeois social relations
within bourgeois social relations. As has been noted, Marx described
the republic as the negation of alienation within alienation.3 8 The War-
ren majority sought to defend this contradiction, but it has been re-
warded by the subsequent introduction of the Nixon-created Burger
court. Madison attempted to confront the problem of the Warren
court in The Federalist No. 10. Here he said that:
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend
of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for
their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity
to this dangerous vice....
... The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights
of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle tb a uni-
formity of interests. . . From the protection of different and un-
equal faculties of acquiring property . . . ensues a division of the
society into different interests and parties.
36. Id. at 97.
37. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 533.
38. K. MARx, supra note 2.
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The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of
man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees
of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil so-
ciety....
A Republic . . . promises the cure for which we are seeking.8
Before the bourgeois revolutions, the bourgeoisie were represented
by the outlook of the French enlightenment, and the Warren court,
in effect, through its relation to the Bill of Rights, continued this
connection. The position of the Enlightenment was that human "ra-
tionalism" had been appropriated, alienated or seized by feudalism.
Lost reason could be restored by education. The property idea of
feudalism was maintained, but negated and repositioned by bour-
geois property ideas. The bourgeois laws (codes, constitutions) would
reeducate and, through enlightened public opinion, alienate the
feudal alienation. "If the laws are good, morals are good," wrote
Diderot, "if the laws are bad, morals are bad."40 In his concurring
opinion in Cooper v. Aaron,41 condemning states' rightist, racial in-
terposition against school integration, Justice Frankfurter, said: "Local
customs, however hardened by time, are not decreed in heaven ....
Experience attests that such local habits and feelings will yield ... to
law and education." The Bill of Rights, especially the first amend-
ment, was derived from the theory of enlightened public opinion and
of the role of the enlightening laws. Hegel pushed the theory of the
Enlightenment to a higher level, suggesting that the educational role
of enlightening law justified the abolition of the state itself. Ignoring
both the appropriative alienation and terror in the class-controlled
state, he urged this through his discussions of the laws of Solon and
the expulsion of Pisistratus. It is not necessary to discuss here this
side of Hegel, save to suggest that it may have been anticipation of
the Marxist theory of the withering of the state under socialism.
Though it also touches the matter of "interiorization," which will be
mentioned later in this paper, it will suffice to indicate that the prob-
lem must be solved materialistically as Diderot perhaps suggests and
39. Tim FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-62 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (J. Madison).
40. D. DmoR, Supplement to Bougainville's Voyage, in DIDEROT INTERPR.TER
OF NATURE 146, 181 (J. Stewart & J. Kemp transl. 1937).
41. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
42. Id. at 25.
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Hegel hints.43 What is now required is to pursue Hegel's thought relat-
ing to terror and to relate it to the activity of the majority of the
Warren court.
Although Hegel, in his Philosophy of Law and elsewhere, was the
theorist of bourgeois hegemony, he realized that the bourgeoisie had
come to power in France through terrorism. He set himself the theo-
retical task of considering the "deterrorizing" of bourgeois power. He
discussed Montesquieu's conception of separation of powers, which,
through certain mediations, nevertheless maintained the state as a unity
of the powers-in-separation, as a design to negate bourgeois terrorism.
Montesquieu's conception of separation of powers and the related
idea of federalism was the truth, juridically expressed, of infrastruc-
tural terroristic social rivalries. The conception of separation of powers
unleashed rather than confined terror. In the Grundrisse, Marx' notes
written in preparation for writing Capital, he indicated that terrorism
was inherent in the infrastructure of capitalism; and, could not be
overcome merely superstructurally. Marx perceived that inherent in
the simplest form of bourgeois social relation, that is, in the sale of
a commodity, there was social separation and social eruption. 44 The
sale split the artifact into its use-value and into its surplus-value. This
split is a social eruption, resulting in social relations based on the
contradiction of domination and of subordination. Surplus-value is
alienation in the juridical meaning of alienation as selfdetermined, as
willed, or as free surrender in which the selfdetermination is never-
theless also seizure, appropriation, occupatio by the dominant or
alienating social force. In a not entirely satisfactory discussion Raceanu
described "alienationization" as "an explosive, accusatory content of
social criticism." 45 The domination is maintained by violence or terror
which emerges directly, as in bourgeois fascism, or threatens to emerge,
as in bourgeois democracy. In Dombrowski v. Pfister" the Warren
court acknowledged the threat of bourgeois state terrorism particu-
laristically when it condemned the "chilling" 47 effect of certain state
43. See G. HEGEL, supra note 35, at 160; cf. G. THoMsON, AESCHYLUS AND
ATHENS 92 (2d ed. 1946).
44. K. M Rx, GRUNDRISSE DER IUrIK DER POLITISCHEN 6KONOmIm 68 (1953).
45. Raceanu, Entfremdung als menschliche Entwicklungsform, 15 Revue roumaine
des sciences sociales, serie de philosophie et logique 105, 109 (1971).
46. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Id. at 487.
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action. In Wilkinson v. United States,48 Justice Black, dissenting, con-
demned "government by intimidation. '49
Before coming to power through its revolution, the French bour-
geoisie condemned feudal terrorism, though its own infrastructure later
required terror or terrorism masked by the so-called rule of law.
Rousseau wrote in the famous first sentence of Contract Social that:
"Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains." ' Jefferson
echoed Rousseau when he claimed for Americans "the rights of men,
of expatriated men." 51 Jefferson echoed Rousseau in his first inaugural
address in 1801, speaking of "the agonising spasms of infuriated man,
seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty .. -52
Rousseau was stating the general alienation or seizure or appro-
priation which feudalism expressed. But within this presentation the
problem of the bourgeoisie itself also may be discovered. This problem
was whether in social relations there could be bourgeois appropria-
tive alienation or estrangement without terror. As appropriative
alienation was reified, fetishized, corporealized or "choseified" in
what was presented juridically as private property, the problem was
whether the alienation-reification was maintained by terror. Of course,
bourgeois theory denied that bourgeois power rested on terror and
sought through natural law theory or its derivative, social contract
theory, to eternalize bourgeois power and to justify it through unhis-
torical or supra-historical rationalist theory. In effect, Hobbes stated
the crisis of the bourgeoisie in his theory that the terror of one
against all in civil society justified the monopoly of the state to be
terroristic. What he masked was that terroristic state power became
the monopoly of the social class which controlled the state through the
terrorism inherent in the property relations of civil society or of the
social infrastructure.
As bourgeois thought developed, the crisis of the reciprocity of
bourgeois property and of state terrorism was further felt. If private
property could justify state terrorism, state terrorism could justify
private property. This appears in the theory of bourgeois criminal
48. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
49. Id. at 421.
50. J. RoussEAu, THE SocIAL CONTRACT AND DiscouRsn ON THE ORIGIN OF
INEQUALITY 7 (L. Crocker ed. 1967).
51. 5 T. JEFFERSON, WITINGs 65 (1853).
52. Inauguration Address, March 4, 1801, in 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFZRSON
317, 319 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).
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law during the Enlightenment, though it must be reiterated that the
crisis was a general crisis and not solely a crisis of criminal law. Bec-
caria condemned capital punishment because it violated the selfde-
termination of the criminal and social contract theory. In the United
States, Livingston advanced beyond Beccaria in that he too con-
demned capital punishment on the basis of the selfdetermination of
the accused, as justified by the social contract. In effect, he explained
selfdetermination because the so-called criminal act was produced by
criminal economic conditions, for instance, unemployment. Livingston
probably was influenced by Holbach who condemned the criminality
of the terroristic state and absolved the criminal (as Hegel did in a
variation on this in The Phenomenology of Mind). In The System
of Nature, Holbach, writing in 1770, said:
[I]f each society, less partial, bestowed on its members the care,
the education, and the assistance which they have the right to ex-
pect, if governments less covetous, and more vigilant, were sedulous
to render their subjects more happy, there would not be seen such
number of malefactors . . . they would not be obliged to destroy
life in order to punish a wickedness, which is commonly ascribable
to the vices of their own institutions ....53
In writing of Hegel's theory of selfdetermined criminal responsibility,
Marx and Engels, in The Holy Family, in effect strengthened Hol-
bach's criticism of terroristic criminal law.
Hegel holds that the criminal must as punishment pass sentence on
himself.... In Hegel this is the speculative disguise of the old jus
talionis that Kant developed as the only legal penal theory.... A
penal theory that at the same time sees in the criminal the man can
do so only in abstraction, in imagination, precisely because punish-
ment, coercion is contrary to human conduct . . .[U]nder human
conditions punishment will really be nothing but the sentence passed
by the culprit on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade him
53. 1 P. HOLBACH, THE SYSTEM OF NATuRn 132 (H. Robinson transl. 1868).
Montesquieu, stating the ideology of the bourgeois Enlightment, said that virtue
may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love re-
quires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of
all private virtues ....
This love is peculiar to democracies ....
Every thing, therefore, depends on establishing this love in a republic;
and to inspire it ought to be the principal business of education ....
1 C. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 34 (T. Nugent transl. 1949). But
in assessing feudal law, Holbach wrote that "[p]ublic esteem has more power over
men of elevated minds than the terrour of the laws." 1 P. HOLBACH, supra, at 131.
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that violence from without, exerted on him by others, is violence
exerted on himself by himself. On the contrary, he will see in other
men his natural saviours from the sentence which he has pronounced
on himself; in other words the relation will be reversed."
An important aspect of the greatness of the Warren majority is that
its determinations in criminal law, which as praxis tend to be con-
sistent with the theory of the Enlightenment and of Marx and Engels
that the state should not be terroristic, are condemned by Kurland
and Bickel.
As has been said, the crisis of criminal law, both during the 18th-
and 20th-centuries has been a particular aspect of the general prob-
lem of the terroristic state. It may be said that Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Douglas and Justice Black perceived most clearly the unity
of particularist state terror with general state terrorism; and that the
aim of such particularist terror was that of introducing universal
terror. The generalized force of the work of these justices in crim-
inal law perhaps has been accepted primarily by laymen and by new
forces now entering the law. This explains the intensity of the attack
on the Warren majority from within the world of law. The attack
assumed many unwarranted forms, including that on the methodo-
logical competence and integrity of the Warren majority, designed to
drive away lay support for the Warren majority.
In this context, the abbd de Mably, a French utopian communist
writing in the 18th-century as a theorist of both the French and Ameri-
can revolutions, becomes extremely important. Through him social
criticism of American state terrorism was sharply indicated a full
half-century before Marx and Engels. Mably personally was very
closely identified with both Jefferson and John Adams. In 1783 or
1784 Mably published the thought which is pertinent to this article
in the fourth and last of a series of letters to John Adams, then
American minister plenipotentiary to Holland and a negotiator of the
peace treaty with the English government. In the English translation,
published in 1784, the fourth letter bears this heading: "Concerning
the Dangers to which the American Confederation stands exposed;
the Circumstances which will rise to Troubles and Divisions; and the
Necessity of augmenting the Power of the Continental Congress."' 5
54. K. MA x & F. ENGELS, THE HOLY FAMILY 238-39 (R. Dixon transl. 1956).
55. DE MABLY, R EMAREs CONCERNING THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LAWS oF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN FOUR LETTERS ADDRESSED TO MR. ADAMS 183 (1785).
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Although Mably supported the American victory in the revolution, he
wrote Adams that "I... tremble for the fate which, probably, attends
you."'5 6 He told Adams that he feared the coming role of the American
bourgeoisie, and hoped that "some limits to the rage of avarice" would
be set.6 7 Because "money is the soul of all their operations,"58s he in-
quired of Adams:
With what eyes, therefore, will they look upon that equality which
your laws have endeavoured to establish amongst the citizens? They
will not deign to comprehend those unalienable privileges and rights
of sovereignty which you attribute to the people. By what means can
riches . .. become prevented from introducing amongst the Ameri-
cans, a division of families, under different classes? 9
Mably continued: "[A] Gracchus only will be wanting ... who will
entice the citizens to rise the one against th.e other, and throw them
into anarchy .. ".."60 These class rivalries were more of a threat to
America, Mably wrote than the fears of intervention or of protec-
tion by England, Spain or Canada.
With you, the authority of the Congress must supply the place of
[Roman] tribunes .... The rich, when they perceived a body im-
powered to sit in judgment upon their actions, would prove guarded
in their enterprises; and the people would, certainly, feel less dis-
quiet and suspicions.... [E]ither the hope or fear of a juridical de-
cision would calm the raging of sedition in America.61
56. Id. at 184.
57. Id. at 259.
58. Id. at 193.
59. Id. at 203.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Id. at 241. In The Federalist No. 34, Hamilton said:
It is well known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority,
in the last resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies-not as
branches of the same legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures,
in each of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the
other, the plebeian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the
unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power
to annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded
as frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence ....
[TMhese two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained
to the utmost height of human greatness.
Tn, FEDERALIST No. 34, at 203-04 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton). In
discussing "federal interposition" against the states through the constitutional guarantee
of republican form of government (Article 4, section 4 of the Constitution), Madison
wrote in the The Federalist No. 43 that "[t]he existence of a right to interpose will
generally prevent the necessity of exerting it." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra, at 284.
See Calhoun, infra note 131 & accompanying text on cassation.
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Thus it emerges from Mably's considerations that social terror de-
velops out of class relations in alienating bourgeois society and that
bourgeois terror dialectically engenders social counter-terror as its
opposite, so that the terrors struggle as a unity-of-opposites.
The role of Mably in the history of American law has been
ignored because he suggested a conception of American history
founded on class struggle. The position which ignores his conception
of American history tends to take the form of suggesting that the
American revolution was not a social revolution, but merely a na-
tional liberation movement. Hence it has been assumed that the text
of the American constitution should be treated as an Anglo-American
common-law document, and therefore not as a text requiring new
legal methodology appropriate to a successful social revolution. The
prevailing outlook ignores John Adams' theory of the revolution as,
in effect, an anti-imperialist struggle to prevent an anticipated English
feudalization of the American colonies even though the English me-
tropolis itself was bourgeois.
As has been said, Hegel condemned the terror of the French
revolution and as a supporter of the French revolution sought to
create and justify "deterrorized" social relations. Without here pre-
senting Hegel's dialectical considerations, he said of the terroristic
state that:
By no manner of means, therefore, can it exhibit itself as anything
but a faction. The victorious faction is called the government; and
just in that it is a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow:
and its being government makes it conversely, into a faction and
hence guilty. . . . Being suspected . . . takes the place, or has the
significance and effect, of being guilty .... 62
Earlier he wrote:
The sole and only work and deed accomplished by universal freedom
is therefore death-a death that achieves nothing, embraces nothing
within its grasp; for what is negated is the unachieved, unfulfilled
punctual entity of the absolutely free self. It is thus the most cold-
blooded and meaningless death of all, with no more significance
than cleaving a head of cabbage or swallowing a draught of water.
In this single expressionless syllable consists the wisdom of the
government .... The government is itself nothing but the self-es-
tablished focus, the individual embodiment of the universal will ....
62. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 605-06.
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[I]t.. . excludes other individuals from a share in its deed, and...
thereby constitutes itself a form of government which is a specifically
determinate will and eo ipso opposed to the universal will.83
Hegel considered bourgeois state terrorism by studying the Montes-
quieuan principle of separation of powers, which, however, were in-
terconnected by a series of mediations, so as to achieve or to maintain
the unity or totality of the state. Thus Hegel's mediations of Montes-
quieuan separation of powers, the latter of which disunite the state,
issue through such mediations as a Rousseauan state. But because
each of the Hegelian-Montesquieuan powers is mediated through the
others, each is itself a totality, and the mediated unity once more may
collapse into the disunity and rivalry of the powers. Thus, Hegel's
study of the weakness of unmediated separation of powers had its
truth in infrastructural rivalry. Bernard Bourgeois stated:
This immanence of the state-whole in each of its powers is the ne-
gation of the thesis of separation of powers, which truly contains the
differentiation required by rationality as its reality, but under the
form where abstract understanding seizes it, that is to say, as the
absolute independence of the powers, the external relations of which
are of pure reciprocal limitation and of hostility. This thesis of
Montesquieu which presupposes among the citizens plebeian absence
from state sense, replaces by a dead equilibrium the living unity of
the organism of the state. It is not the separating understanding
which can apprehend the concrete essence of the state, but it is
reason which conceives it according to the three organic moments
binding the concept: universality, particularity and singularity.04
B. Bourgeois is correct in understanding that Hegel explained
Montesquieuism, as perceiving "among the citizens, plebeian ab-
sence from state sense." But Hegel also knew that the French terror, in
subordinating the French masses, continued, under bourgeois con-
ditions, the historic struggle of domination/dominated-that is, the
struggle to alienate work and the inevitable dialectical struggle to
negate such alienation. Perhaps for Hegel the terror was "meaningless
death" because historically it also precipitated the death of the mean-
ingless. Hegel wrote:
This objective otherness would there be the differentiation which
enabled it to divide itself into stable spiritual spheres and into the
I
63. Id.
64. B. BOURGEOIS, LA PENSkE POLITIQUE DE HEGEL 127 (1969).
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members of distinct powers. These spheres would partly be the
thought-constituted factors of a power that is differentiated into
legislative, judicial and executive . . . and, since the content of uni-
veral action would be more closely taken note of, they would be the
particular spheres of labour, which are further distinguished as more
specific 'estates' or social ranks. Universal freedom . . . could appor-
tion the plurality of individuals to its several organic parts.
The activity and being of personality would, however, find it-
self by this process confined to a branch of the whole, to one kind
of action and existence; . . . it would cease to be in reality univer-
sal self-consciousness. 65
Hegel continued:
Absolute freedom qua pure self-identity of universal will thus car-
ries with it negation .... [T]he organization of the spiritual spheres
or "masses" of the substance, to which the plurality of conscious in-
dividuals is assigned, thus takes shape and form once more. These
individuals, who felt the fear of death, their absolute lord and
master, submit to negation and distinction once more, arrange them-
selves under the "spheres," and return to a restricted and apportioned
task, but thereby to their substantial reality.66
Without pausing to examine the thought of Althusser concerning
the infrastructural meaning of separation of powers as given by
Montesquieu, B. Bourgeois' thought is of importance in considering the
more or less veiled attack by Bickel and Kurland on the Warren ma-
jority for violating older superstructural ideas of separation of powers,
and thus of determinations relating to voting rights and to aspects of
Brown v. Board of Education,7 relating to the unconstitutionality
of racial segregation. The spectre of the "political" decision, to which
Bickel and Kurland are unfriendly, is unfounded. Even though each
of the powers of state has its own outer structure and its own metho-
dology or methodologies, each of the activist powers also has its truth
in the infrastructure of society. Each may, as a "faction" (to invoke
the idea of both Hegel and Mably), enter into rivalry with other
powers or other "factions" for the mediating power, limited only by
the impeaching power of the Congress, which is sacrosanct.6 8 Because
the Warren majority has understood this and has exerted its com-
65. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 603.
66. Id. at 607.
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. Franklin, supra note 4, at 47, 66.
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petence contrary to superstructural ideas of separation of powers,
Bickel and Kurland condemned the Warren majority and hypocriti-
cally, President Nixon demanded "strict" construction or interpreta-
tion of the Constitution.6 The collapse of separation of powers in the
United States is justified dialectically: though each of the powers is a
whole, the mediating hegemony among them, necessitated by their
reciprocity, is constitutionally ambiguous, shifting, equivocal or ironi-
cal, depending on the movement and struggle within the infrastruc-
ture. Although the Warren majority sought to deterrorize the Ameri-
can state without otherwise endangering appropriative alienation-
that is, as a negation of the alienation within alienation7°---the emer-
gence of an anti-Warren court had led to a new struggle for hegemony
among the constitutionally total, but also ambiguous or ironical,
powers.
Although, in essence, each of the powers of state is an Hegelian
totality and their reciprocity is historically ambiguous, nevertheless
the unity of the powers, though not the hegemony of anyone, is also
required by the analogical force of article four, section four of the
Constitution: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government." While the full force of
this text of the Constitution has been narcotized for almost two hun-
dred years (in part before the civil war because of slavery), the War-
ren majority tended in praxis to allow this text to erupt into actuality.
As has been, indicated, it is the explosions and the possibility of
eruptions of narcotized texts of the Constitution which disturb the
theorists of so-called "strict" construction or interpretation.
III. THE PERMANENCE OF BOURGEOIS TERRORISM
As has been said, Hegel conceived in The Phenomenology of
Mind that the French terror could be overcome by mediating Montes-
quieuan powers of state and achieving a Rousseauan totality or unity
of the state. Despite what he said of the terror, there can be no mistake
that Hegel was one of the great defenders of the French revolution.
Indeed, in his Philosophy of Law, he indirectly defended the terror.
In 1920 Albert Mathiez wrote: "When revolutionary France, attacked
69. See Ulmer, supra note 6.
70. See K. MARx, supra note 2.
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on all its frontiers by monarchial Europe and torn from within by a
part of its offspring who compromised with the enemy, resolved to
overcome or to die, it concentrated its forces in a supreme effort, it
organized the terror, which was the necessary instrument to victory."'1
Writing before Mathiez, in his Philosophy of Law, Hegel stated that
if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens
are in duty bound to answer the summons to its defence. If in such
circumstances the entire state is under arms and is torn from its
domestic life at home to fight abroad, the war of defence turns into
a war of conquest.72
Thus, Hegel here perceived what he did not overtly acknowledge in
The Phenomenology of Mind. But, because the infrastructure of the
French revolution issued as Napoleonic bourgeois imperialism, Marx
and Engels wrote in The Holy Family that:
Napoleon already discerned the essence of the modern state; he
understood that it is based on the unhampered development of
bourgeois society, on the free movement of private interest, etc. He
decided to recognize and protect that basis. He was no terrorist
with his head in the clouds. Yet at the same time he still regarded
the state as an end in itself and civil life only as a treasurer and his
subordinate which must have no will of its own. He perfected the
Terror by substituting permanent war for permanent revolution.73
In The Holy Family Marx and Engels described the terror as re-
flecting an inner crisis within the French revolutionary bourgeoisie
itself. This unites with the above-stated considerations of Mathiez and
Hegel in The Philosophy of Law relative to the terror.
During the French revolution terrorist law was open, not veiled.
"Every revolution is a conquest," said Portalis, speaking for
la commission du gouvernement, on 24 thermidor of the year VIII,
in submitting to France the projet of the civil code. "How are
laws made in the passage from the ancient to the new government?
By the very force of things, these laws are necessarily antagonistic,
partial, disruptive. The necessity triumphs for weakening all habits,
for weakening all ties, for widening all discontents. The private re-
lations of men among themselves are no longer a concern; only
the political and general aim is noticed; allies instead of fellow citi-
zens are sought for. All becomes public law.
71. A. MATHIEZ, PTUDES SUR ROBESPIERRE 63 (1958).
72. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT [LAW] 210-11 (T. Knox transl. 1952).
73. K. MARx & F. ENGELS, supra note 54, at 166 (emphasis in original).
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"If attention is fixed on the civil laws, it is less to make them
more sage or more just, than to make them more favorable to those
to whom it is necessary to give a liking for the regime which it is
intended to establish .... We call revolutionary esprit the exalted
desire of sacrificing violently all rights to a political end and of no
longer admitting any consideration but that of a mysterious and
variable interest of the state.
"In such a moment, it is impossible to regulate things and men,
with the sageness that resides in durable establishments, and accord-
ing to the principles of natural equity of which human legislators
should only be respectful interpreters.
"Today France is at rest; and the constitution which guarantees
this repose permits fruitful thought.
"From good civil laws comes the greatest good that men can
give and receive; they are the source of moeurs, the palladium of
property, and the guarantee of all public and private peace: if they
do not establish the government, they maintain it."'74
Of this the present writer said in 1942: "Portalis, above all, per-
ceived that law could pass into its opposite, lawlessness, and enjoy a
socially disruptive and socially provocative role, so as to create the
conditions for a new law, which would absorb and yet also overcome
both the old law and its lawless opposite.' 75
To a degree, Hegel, in his Philosophy of History, spoke of Na-
poleon's state, after the earlier terror, in much the same way as Marx
and Engels.
Napoleon restored it as a military power, and followed up this step
by establishing himself as an individual will at the head of the State:
he knew how to rule, and soon settled the internal affairs of France.
The avocats, ideologues and abstract-principle men who ventured to
show themselves he sent "to the right-about," and the sway of mis-
trust was exchanged for that of respect and fear.76
As will be suggested later, Hegel's reference to Napoleonic terrorism
is also a reference to the terrorism of Kant, masked in the latter's
74. Franklin, The Eighteenth Brumaire in Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. RFv. 514, 514-15
(1942) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted), quoting Discours priliminaire pro-
nond par Portalis, le 24 thermidor an 8, lors de la prisentation du projet arr~ti par
la commission du gouvernement (1800), in 1 FENET, RECUEIL COAIPLET DES TRAVAUX
PREPAIATOIRES DU CODE civir. 464-65 (1827).
75. Id. at 516 (emphasis in original).
76. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 451 (J. Sibree transl. 1956) (emphasis
in original).
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formalistic categorical imperative and duty ideas. Moreover, it may be
added that the concept of "respect" for Napoleon reappears in the
period of Hitler in Heidegger's theory of "respect," a terroristic prin-
ciple hidden in the "impure," Husserlian intentionality theory of
Heidegger in his work, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Hegel
pursued his discussion of Napoleon, saying that Napoleon "then...
turned his attention to foreign relations, subjected all Europe, and
diffused his liberal institutions in every quarter."77 In the restoration,
Hegel continued:
the main feature of incompatibility still presents itself, in the re-
quirement that the ideal general will should also be the empirically
general-i.e. that the units of the State, in their individual capacity,
should rule, or at any rate take part in the government.... [T]he
party in question allows no political organization to be firmly es-
tablished. The particular arrangements of the government are forth-
with opposed by the advocates of Liberty as the mandates of a
particular will, and branded as displays of arbitrary power....
[A]gitation and unrest are perpetuated. This collision, this nodus,
this problem is that with which history is now occupied, and whose
solution it has to work out in the future.78
In The Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre absolutized the
problem of the French terror, restating the problem of the divided
bourgeoisie during the terror by his existential conception of "Frater-
nitd-Terreur"79-- of terror both as death and as freedom from death.
Hyppolite recently wrote of the terror that
in this very process Absolute Liberty was actualized, though in
reality it achieved the reverse of what it sought. Whereas it con-
ceived itself to be a positive force, it was merely a negative principle
which resulted in the destruction of the individuals identified with
it ....
A total democracy emerged, but as the very opposite of
what it claimed to be. . . . Robespierre resorted to religion for
a focus and support for the Republic. "Robespierre," says Hegel,
"set up the principle of virtue as supreme, and it may be said that
he was serious about virtue."
As to the outcome of this turmoil, Hegel's reflections in the
Phenomenology are hardly unambiguous. After Robespierre there
77. Id.
78. Id. at 452 (emphasis in original).
79. J.-P. SARTRE, CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON DIALECTIQUE 646 (1960) (emphasis in
original).
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follows a name unmentioned as such, but surely we are meant to
read between the lines of the name of Napoleon. For it is Napoleon
who restored the State.80
But obviously Hyppolite, unlike Marx and Engels, detests the state
as a thing-in-itself, whereas Marx and Engels, and to a certain extent
Hegel, perceived an opposition between the state and the terroristic
state, each of which is what it is because it is the apex of definite infra-
structure. Heidegger's theory of Angst or dread in Being and Time
also seems to be an existential absolutization of bourgeois terror. In
general, Heidegger's writing is saturated with the language of violence.
In discussing the terror, Hegel said that:
The sole and only work and deed accomplished by universal freedom
is therefore death-a death that achieves nothing, embraces nothing
within its grasp; for what is negated is the unachieved, unfulfilled
punctual entity of the absolutely free self. It is thus the most cold-
blooded and meaningless death of all, with no more significance
than cleaving a head of cabbage or swallowing a draught of water.8 1
This is an echo of Hegel's already mentioned concern with death and
dread of death in his basic discussion of appropriative alienation in the
dialectic of domination and oppression, which is the very heart of
The Phenomenology of Mind. He wrote:
We have seen what bondage is only in relation to lordship. But it
is a self-consciousness, and we have now to consider what it is, in
this regard, in and for itself. In the first instance, the master is
taken to be the essential reality for the state of bondage; hence, for
it, the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself, al-
though this truth is not taken yet as inherent in bondage itself. Still,
it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity and
self-existence, because it has experienced this reality within it. For
this consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element or that,
nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being;
it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master. It has been in that
experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its
every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within
it.82
80. J. HYPPOLITE, STUDIES ON MARX AND HEGEL 57-58 (J. O'Neill transl. 1969)
(footnotes omitted).
81. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 605 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 237.
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But in Heidegger's Angst or dread or anxiety, as distinguished from
Hegel's Furcht or fear, the force of infrastructurally created terror is
absolutized, existentialized, along with the materiality of the infra-
structure itself which is veered into idealist hyperstructure. In his
discussion of terrorism, Hegel may be said to have "deontologized"
Heidegger's Angst by returning it to infrastructural bourgeois history.
In The Phenomenology of Mind Hegel, as an early bourgeois, said
that the negation of
[a]bsolute freedom qua pure self-identity of universal will thus
carries with it negation .... These individuals, who felt the fear
of death, their absolute lord and master, submit to negation and dis-
tinction once more, arrange themselves under the "spheres," and
return to a restricted and apportioned task, but thereby to their sub-
stantial reality.83
Here Hegel related terror to the bourgeois alienation or appropriation
of work, and ultimately to language as socially related to social work or
praxis.
In the Introduction to Metaphysics the latter-day Heidegger's
bourgeois terrorism is masked: it is more subtle and also more so-
cially organized than in earlier writing. "Only if we understand that
the use of power in language, in understanding, in forming and build-
ing helps to create (i.e. always, to bring forth) the violent act
(Gewalttat) of laying out paths into the environing power of the
essent, only then shall we understand the strangeness, the uncanniness
of all violence."8' 4 Heidegger suggests the relation between language,
which is the world of the jurist, and violence, which, as has been said,
is a form of terror. He continued:
The power, the powerful, in which the action of the violent
one moves, is the entire scope of the machination (Machenschaft),
machanoen, entrusted to him. We do not tale the word "machina-
tion" in a disparaging sense. We have in mind something essential
that is disclosed to us in the Greek word techn. Techne means
neither art nor skill, to say nothing of technique in the modem
sense. We translate techne by "knowledge." . ..Knowledge in the
authentic sense of technF is the initial and persistent looking out
83. Id. at 607 (emphasis in original).
84. M. HEIDEGOER, AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS 132 (R. Manheim
transl. 1961).
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beyond what is given at any time .... The Greeks called art in the
true sense of the work of art techn , because art is what most im-
mediately brings being (i.e. the appearing that stands there in it-
self) to stand, stabilizes it in something present (the work) ....
[I]t brings about the phenomenon in which the emerging power ...
comes to shine....
. . . Art is knowledge and therefore techn. Art is not techno
because it involves "technical" skill, tools, materials ....
... Thus techni provides the basic trait of... the violent; for
violence... is the use of power. . . against the overpowering,.. :
through knowledge it wrests being from concealment into the mani-
fest as the essent 8 5
It is not at all difficult to suggest that Heidegger is justifying legal
methodology as such as terroristic. In The Philosophy of Law Hegel
condemned judicial power because it was founded on the alienating
relation of domination and subordination which already has been
sketched in this paper.8 6 This, too, is the force of Kakfa's The Trial,
in which the subject of law is veered by the terroristic, secretive legal
order into an object of law and is destroyed. Nevertheless, the Warren
majority set itself the task of deterrorizing American constitutional
law, while maintaining bourgeois appropriative alienation.
This author has condemned segregation "where cold terror in-
timidates law, where the force of the Constitution is overcome by
the constitution of force."' 7 In the contemporary American law school,
the terror of present-day social relations has been particularistically
admitted, though without confession of bourgeois power, bourgeois
legal methodology, bourgeois content, bourgeois ambiguity, and
bourgeois structure. Charles A. Reich has written that: "The ten-
dency of administration, while it may appear to be benign, and peace-
ful, as opposed to the turbulence of conflict, is actually violent."'8
The American sociologist Talcott Parsons noted that: "
Though there is no formally defined administrative structure segre-
gated from non-political functions one may say that the limits of
this loyalty are essentially those of acceptability or belongingness
in the requisite collectivity. Barnard's well-known criterion applies
85. Id. at 133 (emphasis in original).
86. G. HEGEL, supra note 72, at 145.
87. Franklin, The Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Third Constitution, 4 How. L.J. 170, 192 (1958).
88. C. RErcH, THE GREENING oF AMERICA 107 (1970).
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here; that defiance of authority is essentially a bid to take over the
responsibility of the agent of authority. The outcome of successful
resistance to such bid is, if the defiance is persisted in, extrusion of
the bidder from the collectivity-in extreme cases perhaps by exe-
cution.8 9
In his own way, even Merleau-Ponty at one time, in effect, re-
stated the amplitude and permanence of bourgeois state terrorism.
"Within the U.S.S.R. violence and deception have official status while
humanity is to be found in daily life. On the contrary, in democra-
cies the principles are humane but deception and violence rule daily
life."90 Describing the position of Merleau-Ponty in French existen-
tialist thought, Burnier stated that: "The Communists did not invent
terror; they found it already established. Anti-Communists 'refuse to
see that violence is everywhere.' "91 Elsewhere Burnier said "Merleau-
Ponty attacked progressivism mercilessly for 'its dreamy gentleness, its
incurable stubbornness, its velvet-gloved violence.'"92 At the time in
which Merleau-Ponty thus wrote, he regarded bourgeois terrorism
not as the outcome of the thought or bourgeois "extremists," but as
permanently inherent in bourgeois society, though he did not offer
an infrastructural explanation for humanism or terrorism.
In the above presentation Hegel both condemned the French
terror and defended the French revolution by explicitly invoking
Montesquieuan ideas of separation of powers. These, however, erupt
into new terroristic struggles, more or less disguised, brought about
by infrastructural crisis. Thus terroristic appropriative alienation
seems permanent or inherent in the bourgeois state. Nevertheless, the
Warren majority sought to negate bourgeois terror without condemn-
ing bourgeois appropriative alienation. The Warren court was, with-
out qualification, a bourgeois court. Its critics did not perceive the
problem of the Warren majority nor the differentiation it sought to
realize between the terror of alienation and the alienation of terror.
Although Hegel's resort to Montesquieuan conceptions was di-
rected against bourgeois terrorism, the further development of his
thought against Kant suggests that bourgeois terrorism was masked,
89. Parsons, Authority, Legitimation, and Political Action, in AUTHORITY 197,
212 (C. Friedrich ed. 1958).
90. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, HUMANISM AND TERROR 180 (J. O'Neill transl. 1969).
91. M. BURNIER, CHoICE OF AcTioN 47 (B. Murchland transl. 1968).
92. Id. at 92.
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but not overcome, by Kant's categorical imperative. Thus, there is
a development from the French terror to Kant to Heidegger. How-
ever, the problem of the mask, of the incognito, of the disguise, of
guile, of the image, of semblance (which in the modem civil law be-
comes the problem of simulation and of the interposed person) was
stated by Diderot before the French revolution.
It is necessary to veil certain ideas. Is it necessary to veil its wicked-
ness? Is it necessary to let it come to light? Is it necessary to be
shameless or hypocritical? . . .Desire is hidden under the veil; lift
the veil, desire is augmented, and pleasure commences.93
Hegel saw that Kant maintained, but also concealed, bourgeois
terrorism. This is important because it indicates the difficulty of the
methodology of the Warren majority. Although Hegel in The Phe-
nomenology of Mind believed that his theory of mediated Montes-
quieuan separation of powers in semblance might for a period seem
to deterrorize the bourgeois state, he also perceived that after the
French revolution Kant had not solved but had hidden the problem
of bourgeois terrorism. Findlay, as a philosophic idealist, described
this, first restating Hegel's discussion of the French terror. "And since,
after the destruction of all social estates and positions, there is nothing
positive left to liquidate, this fury can only be turned inward on
itself."0' 4 Findlay then continued:
An absolute Freedom which liquidates the complex, positive organi-
zation of society therefore shows itself to be self-liquidating. Its prin-
ciple must be carried over into that of a freedom which develops a
social order as part of itself. From being a negative will which
impartially liquidates anyone and everyone, it must swing over
into being a positive will which is the impartial will of all. It must
rise to the freedom which is a freedom from particular interest, to
the 'autonomy' of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Hegel sees in the
positive impartiality of the Categorical Imperative a mere transfor-
mation of the death-dealing negative impartiality of the guillotine.95
In The Phenomenology of Mind Hegel brings forward Kant's cate-
gorical imperative as only the formal negation of bourgeois terror-
ism, supplemented by his discussion in section 135 of his Philosophy
93. 20 OmUvREs COMPL TES DE DIDEROT 353 (1821).
94. J. FINDLAY, HEGEL: A RE-EXAMINATION 124 (1958).
95. Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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of Law.98 Hegel wrote in The Phenomenology of Mind that after the
French terror the
single self ...is merely the form of the subject or concrete real
action, a form which by it is known as form. In the same way ob-
jective reality, 'being,' is for it absolutely self-less form; for that
objective reality would be what is not known: this knowledge, how-
ever, knows knowledge to be the essential fact.
Absolute freedom has thus squared and balanced the self-opposi-
tion of universal and single will.97
But the formal negation of Kant's negation of the French terror does
not end the negated terror. What Hegel said of the French terror is
also true in Kant's formalism. Of the French terror, Hegel wrote,
"[a]ll these determinate elements disappear with the disaster and ruin
that overtake the self in the state of absolute freedom; its negation is
meaningless death, sheer horror of the negative which has nothing
positive in it, nothing that gives a filling."9' 8 Because Kant's formal
categorical imperative also lacked "filling," that is, content or deter-
mination, it was a negation which concealed or masked terror of the
bourgeois infrastructure. Kant's bourgeois secretiveness reflected his
position as a bourgeois philosopher in feudal Germany, which lagged
behind the great accomplishments of the French, English and Ameri-
can revolutions. It is one of Hegel's own greatest accomplishments
that he showed Kant's formalism to be veiled or secreted bourgeois
terrorism.
Hegel's thinking has the utmost juridical importance, especially
in measuring the work of the Warren majority. This relation must be
further explained. In introducing the formal categorical imperative
Kant methodologically subordinated the content of bourgeois terror-
istic power to bourgeois form, which was thus undialectically sepa-
rated from the bourgeois content. Moreover, Kant's "contentless"
bourgeois form was also subject to the principle of postponeability-
the formal categorical imperative was a bourgeois imperative which
must be realized in the future of -then feudal Germany. This is Kant's
response to the immediacy of the French bourgeois terror. But the
principles of postponeability or futurity for him postulate immortality
96. G. HEGEL, supra note 72, at 89-90.
97. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 609-10.
98. Id. at 608 (footnote omitted).
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and the postulate of immortality requires the postulate of the holy
moral legislator. This holy moral legislator (secularized in the 20th-
century) may, because of its hierarchical position act arbitrarily, am-
biguously, ironically, equivocally, or hypocritically. It may, in the
language of Sartre, justify bad faith. In the language of Bracton in
the 13th-century and of -Hegel in the 19th-century it may exercise
juridical agility. Kant's agile holy moral legislator may, in German,
be guilty of Verstellung, or, in French, of diplacement. As the holy
moral legislator may be arbitrary, Kant both concealed and strength-
ened bourgeois terrorism. It seems obvious that the hegemony of
Kant's holy moral legislator may be restated as the hegemony of the
methodology of the "neutral" bourgeois jurist of the 19th- and 20th-
centuries, which masks terror. In An Introduction to Metaphysics
Heidegger wrote: "Every essential form of spiritual life is marked by
ambiguity."' 9 In ambiguity the aim is to move from possibility to
actuality. Hence it is not exactly the same as Verstellung, ddplace-
ment, equivocation, or shuffling, where the aim is to shift from actu-
ality to possibility. However, both maintain contingency as terrorist.
In Verstellung, or shuffling, Hegel said consciousness is confronted by
" 'a perfect nest'" of Kantian contradictions. Here consciousness "pro-
ceeds by fixing definitely one moment, passing thence immediately
over to another and doing away with the first."'00 Hegel continued:
But, as soon as it has now set up this second moment, it also "shifts"
(verstellt) this again, and really makes the opposite the essential
element .... It thereby confesses that, as a matter of fact, it is in
earnest about neither of them. The various moments of this vertigi-
nous fraudulent process we must look at more closely,' 01
But in the theory of ambiguity as well as in that of Verstellung or
ddplacement, the legal subject dominates the legal object. Both in
ambiguity and in Verstellung contingency enters, but hidden by
Kantian formalist methodology. In both, arbitrariness lurks and terror,
or fear of nothingness, may annihilate being.
Some of the criticism of the Warren majority rests in the fact
that it, too, has employed shifting, ambiguity, balance, irony, Sartrean
bad faith, agility, equivocation, Verstellung, ddplacement, and pos-
99. M. HEEDEGGER, supra note 84, at 8.
100. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 629.
101. Id. at 629-30 (emphasis in original).
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sibility. But, as suggested earlier in this essay, Justice Frankfurter
was a theorist of Lebensphilosophie, or philosophy of life-a Kantian
bourgeois philosophic tendency that anticipated existentialism-which
'is philosophy of formal possibility or abstract possibility and hence
masked terrorism. The Kantian antinomies or "nest of contradictions"
were mediated secretively and hyperstructurally, that is, by ddplace-
ment, by the unhistoric prince of the 18th-century, by Kant's formalist
holy moral legislator, by Kant's artist-genius of his Critique of Judg-
ment, by Leibniz' holy watch-maker, by Descartes' god-assistant, and
by external mediation in general, all of which suggest Hegel's fear-
producing, "oriental" despot. In the early 19th-century this was called
irony; in the later 19th-century tragedy. Perhaps this is Hegel's theory
of comedy as mask or veil of the persona. Though he did not acknowl-
edge that Justice Frankfurter was Kantian, Bickel noted that he
never successfully identified sources from which this judgment was
to be drawn that would securely limit as well as nourish it, he
never achieved a rigorous general accord between judicial su-
premacy and democratic theory, so that the boundaries of the one
could be described with some precision in terms of the other, and he
was thus unable to ensure that the teaching of a duty of judgment
would be received as subordinate to the teaching of abstention, for
the relationship between the two is itself a matter for the judgment
of statesmen.
Both teachings were his, unresolved from the beginning. His
posterity was free to receive both. It inhered in the Court's past, in
contemporary demands upon it .... 102
It has been mentioned that in his considerations on "eastern"
philosophy Hegel said that
there can but be the relation of lord and slave, and in this despotic
sphere fear constitutes the ruling category. Because the will is not
yet free from what is finite, it can therein be comprehended and the
finite can be shown forth as negative. This sensation of negation, that
something cannot last, is just fear as distinguished from freedom
which does not consist in being finite but in being for itself, and this
cannot be laid hold of. Religion necessarily has this character, since
the fear of the Lord is the essential element beyond which we can-
not get. 03
102. A. BIcKEL, supra note 17, at 34.
103. G. HEGEL, supra note 35.
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In the history of law and of bourgeois life in the 20th-century in gen-
eral, the above-mentioned "Lord" has been secularized and cor-
porealized, but terror has been maintained. Because the secular and
corporealized lord is veered by the formalism of Kant's categorical
imperative into the god-like jurist, the categorical formalism justifies
to itself its own content, which it masks as the real content. As the
real content is only the semblance of content, Kantian ambiguity,
placement/displacement, equivocation, irony, and Verstellung reign
in and behind the agility of the jurist and of the legal text as sem-
blance. Thus, Kant's categorical imperative, through its formalism,
becomes the terrorism of legal method. And behind this and ul-
timately explaining the agility of legal method is infrastructural
appropriative alienation.
As early as 1928 Marcuse wrote:
A fact obtains its historical purity only if it is placed within the
concrete context out of which it became a fact. But, as such, it becomes
ambiguous as a result of the multiplicity of meanings that it had for
that period. And this ambiguity must be preserved.
This seems to indicate an internal inconsistency of the dialectic.
Are the facts not accepted if they are grasped in their historical neces-
sity? Does not this dialectical undifferentiated appraisal threaten the
inner meaning of facts in their radical implications? Henceforth the
dialectic is inescapably faced with the problem of value.104
In general the theory of ambiguity has been the preoccupation of
subsequent existentialist philosophical literature. In 1954 Wahl wrote:
[W]e can remark that it is less the idea of paradox and the idea of
tension and of dialectic which, for example, Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty present, than the idea of ambiguity.... Different interpreta-
tions are possible, different possible decipherants of human action,
and we are free to choose and we are, at the same time, is a situa-
tion to choose the interpretation which we prefer to give.105
In the United States, Wild and Edie, writing in 1963, stated that:
Nothing historical ever has just one meaning; meaning is ambiguous
and is seen from an infinity of viewpoints. Everything is always
becoming meaningful .... 106
104. Marcuse, Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism, 4
TELos 3, 23 (1969).
105. J. WAHL, LEs PHILOSOPHIES DE L'EXISTENCE 129-30 (1954).
106. Wild & Edie, Preface to M. MERLEAU-PONTY, IN PRAISE OF PHILOSOPHY at
xix (J. Wild & J. Edie transl. 1963) (emphasis in original).
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Sartre said: "In irony a man annihilates what he posits within one
and the same act; he leads us to believe in order not to be believed;
he affirms to deny and denies to affirm; he creates a positive object but
it has no being other than its nothingness."' 107 This is similar to what
Sartre in Being and Nothingness called bad faith.
The role of ambiguity or subjective irony or what Hegel called
Kantian Verstellung and Vuillemin ddplacement, which in 1928 Mar-
cuse said "must be preserved," is required by Marcuse's relation to
existentialism. In 1927 Heidegger wrote that "ambiguity has already
established itself in the understanding as a potentiality-for-Being, and
and in the way Dasein projects itself and presents itself with possibili-
ties."'' 08 This formal or subjective possibility, as distinguished from
Hegel's conception of real possibility as a unity-in-opposition of ac-
tuality and real possibility, is the mark of existentialism. Abbaguano
penetrates to the philosophical kernel of existentialism when he indi-
cates that the criterion of existentialism is the existential theory of
possibility.
The conceptual instrument, i.e., the category that existentialism em-
ploys in all its forms is that of possibility. In fact it carries out the
analysis of human existence ... in the world as the analysis of the
possibilities open to man in his confrontation with men and things. 00
The full import of the existentialist theory of possibility is indi-
cated by Schrader in his discussion of Kant's Critique of Judgment.
No man, in Kant's view, is born with a moral character. He is en-
dowed at birth with neither the actuality nor the potentiality of one.
If he is to have a character at all, he must create it. It is a possibility
which confronts him, but again not as anything determinate. He has
no model to guide him, but must construct it. The model is the form
in which he represents himself to himself under the idea of freedom.
If he takes the model too seriously, he negates the freedom which it
was intended to serve and instruct. To use Kant's terminology, the
model is a schema and functions symbolically. It gives expression to
the ideal in concrete form and thus provides a rule for action; but at
the same time it refers beyond itself as does the work of art. A
107. J.-P. SAm, BEINo AND NOTHINGNESS 47 (H. Barnes transl. 1956).
108. M. HEIDEGER, BEING AND TIsm 217 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson transl.
1962) (footnote omitted).
109. N. ABBAGNANO, CRrrICA EXISTENTIALISm 226 (N. Langiulli transl. 1969)
(emphasis in original).
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morally good life, like a work of art, must be taken as the symbolic
expression of freedom.110
Bickel did not seem to realize that Kantian formalist methodolog-
ical ambiguity is inherent in bourgeois social activity, including law,
and that it is inherently terroristic because of the crisis of the bour-
geois infrastructure. In his essay On the Jewish Question Marx said:
To be sure, in periods when the political state as such is forcibly born
from civil society, when men strive to liberate themselves under the
form of political self-liberation, the state can and must go as far as
to abolish and destroy religion, but only in the way it abolishes pri-
vate property by setting a maximum, confiscation, and progressive
taxation or only in the way it abolishes life by the guillotine. In mo-
ments of special concern for itself political life seeks to repress its
presupposition, civil society and its elements, and to constitute itself
the actual, harmonious species-life of man. But it can do this only
in violent contradiction with its own conditions of existence by de-
claring the revolution to be permanent, and thus the political drama
is bound to end with the restoration of religion, private property, and
all the elements of civil society just as war ends with peace."1 :
As has been said, the Warren majority, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,
sought to condemn the "chilling" effect of terror."12 The majority of
the Burger court has sought to "chill" or to terrorize this "deterroriza-
tion." In Laird v. Tatum,"3 Chief Justice Burger presented himself
as interested in the "philosophical underpinnings" 1 4 of the Bill of
Rights. This philosopher-jurist restated "chill," not as social terror
related to appropriative alienation, but as thermal chill-indeed, as
the thermal chill of a Heideggerian homeless, or an isolated, particu-
laristic bourgeois Robinson Crusoe at the North Pole in a cotton seer-
sucker. But in truth, Chief Justice Burger's thermal chill is Thermido-
rian heat. He said of the respondents' "alleged chill""15 that
they have also cast considerable doubt on whether they themselves
are in fact suffering from any such chill.... Even assuming a justi-
110. Schrader, The Philosophy of Existence, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT AND
OUR MODERN WORLD 25, 42-43 (C. Hendel ed. 1957).
111. MARx, supra note 3, at 227-28 (emphasis in original).
112. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
113. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id. at 13 n.7.
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ciable controversy, if respondents themselves are not chilled, but
seek only to represent those "millions" whom they believe are so
chilled, respondents clearly lack that "personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy" essential to standing.'1 6
In his dissent Justice Douglas said that "As Chief justice Warren has
observed, the safeguards in the main body of the Constitution did not
satisfy the people on their fear and concern of military domi-
nance .... ,,117 Douglas condemned the "'present inhibiting effect' "118
of army surveillance on first amendment rights.
The Warren majority, when it was the majority, sought to miti-
gate terror, that is, to veer the terror of contingency into the con-
tingency of terror, to veer the terror of ambiguity into the ambiguity
of terror. The Burger majority seeks to veer the contingency of terror
into the terror of contingency, the ambiguity of terror into the terror
of ambiguity.
What is lacking both in the Warren and the Burger majorities
is the struggle to present accurately categories which reflect reality.
In Science of Logic Hegel said of the categories:
First they serve as abbreviations through their universality (for what
a host of particulars of outer existence and actions is embraced by
a conception ... .). Secondly, the categories serve for the more exact
determination and discovery of objective relations .... 119
Bickel did not seem to realize that the weak position of the
American bourgeoisie as such at the time of the formulation of the
first or Philadelphia constitution is reflected in the structural instability
or ambiguity of the first Constitution. After the conclusion of the
constitutional convention of 1787, Madison wrote Jefferson in Paris
regarding "the impossibility of dividing powers of legislation, in such
a manner, as to be free from different constructions by different in-
terests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impar-
tial . .. .120 To this may be added what already has been said re-
garding the role of the Warren majority in seizing or restoring the
116. Id. at 13-14 n.7.
117. Id. at 22 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted).
119. G. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC 34-35 (A. Miller iransl. 1969) (emphasis in
original).
120. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in 5
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 17, 26 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
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original 18th-century determinate or determinable force of the Con-
stitution, especially the hierarchical role of the second Constitution
or Bill of Rights, which mitigates the force of ambiguity of the first
Constitution. Because ambiguities were exploited by reactionary forces
before the emergence of the Warren majority, its critics are not justi-
fied in suggesting that, in effect, acquired rights are based on the ap-
propriation of ambiguous constitutional texts or constitutional struc-
tures by justices who dominated the court prior to the situation repre-
sented by the Warren majority. In 1964 this author said that:
In Jeffersonian thought the power that must struggle through the
force of public opinion to gain the paramount place in the state,
so that its hegemony is recognized, and followed by the others ...
"is the power that at a given historical moment will best defend the
American people and their democratic and national attainments;
and public opinion becomes a force in Jeffersonian theory while the
spirit of the people is up, that is, while it is active and ceases to be
contemplative." This is justified by the hegemony given to unalien-
ated Public Opinion by the First Amendment, the keystone, as
Justice Black believes, of the Constitution, because it dominates the
formally ambiguous First or Montesquieuan Constitution. This is
fortified by the Encyclopidiste theory of the republic, the authority of
which is guaranteed by the First Constitution itself.
If this thought is rejected it means that the possibilities under
the First Constitution permanently become the exclusive property of
social forces which indeed were not strong enough in 1787 to formu-
late an unambiguous constitution consecrating their own power ex-
clusively. Said otherwise, the formally ambiguous First Constitution,
dominated by the First Amendment, as consecrating the Public
Opinion State, indeed may reject or justify the power of the Su-
preme Court.' 2 '
This is not the thought of Justice Frankfurter. Kurland notices
that Frankfurter acknowledged the ambiguity of the Constitution, al-
though he stated this as textual ambiguity, while overlooking that there
also was structural and methodological ambiguity. Frankfurter said of
the constitutional texts that "[t]heir ambiguity is such that the Court
is compelled to put meaning into the Constitution not to take it
121. Franklin, Influence of the Abbi de Mably and of Le Mercier de la Riviire on
American Constitutional Ideas Concerning the Republic and Judicial Review, in PER-
SPECTIVES Or LAW-ESSAYS FOR AuSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 96, 125 (1964). What has
been said is fortified by the impeachment power.
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out.' u 22 This justifies the appropriation or alienation of the constitu-
tional texts and structure by the Kantian terroristic, agile external-
mediator-jurist, who subordinates the constitution by himself choosing
among his possibilities. Philosophy of life, Lebensphilosophie, justifies
this Kantian agility. To reiterate what Schrader said: "If he takes the
model too seriously, he negates the freedom which it was intended to
serve and instruct. To use Kant's terminology, the model is a schema
and functions symbolically."''1  The Constitution thus collapses into
projet or schema, although it was intended to be the promulgation of a
projet or schema.
Beyer suggests that "there is a relation between the latter-day
Heidegger and Schleiermacher, who says that one of the basic missions
of-hermeneutics [or interpretation] reads: 'to comprehend... a writer
better than he comprehends himself.' ",124 Heidegger himself wrote:
"Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is un-
derstood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in
understanding.' 1 25
S. Kirner refers to Heine's famous position that Kant is "the
thinker 'whose terrorism by far exceeded that of Maximilien Robes-
pierre.' "126 Though Ebbinghaus is shocked by lack of "respect" (a
word which really connotes submission to appropriative alienation)
to Kant, 2 7 Jean Hyppolite perceives "terror" in Rousseau's "general
will," which becomes "interiorized" in the thought of Kant. 2 It is
beyond the scope of this paper to relate "interiorization" to the ter-
rorism which develops from Kant's formal categorical imperative, or
to the agility of bourgeois legal methodology which is terroristic be-
cause it justifies the arbitrary choices of the jurist and makes the con-
stitutional text the mere semblance of itself.
122. P. KuLAsND, supra note 5, at 3.
123. Schrader, supra note 110, at 43.
124. See Franklin, The Mandarinism of Phenomenological Philosophy of Law,
in 2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 541 (M. Natanson ed. 1973) (em-
phasis in original).
125. M. HEmEGGER, supra note 108, at 188-89.
126. S. K6SRER, KANT 206 (1955).
127. See generally Ebbinghaus, Interpretation and Misinterpretation of the Cate-
gorical Imperative, in KANT 211 (R. Wolff ed. 1967).
128. 2 G. HEGEL, LA PHIENOMENOLOGIE DE L'ESPRIT 139 n.212 (J. Hyppolite
transl. 1947). See also J. HYPPOLITE, GENiSE ET STRUCTURE DE LA PHnNOIsNOLOOIE
DE L'ESPRIT DE HEGEL 166 (1946). Of Kant, Hyppolite wrote "[the maxim of action
is not fear of God or the desire to please him; it is always the will of pure duty." Id.
at 465.
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Giinter Rohrm6ser says that he is in part influenced by Joachim
Ritter's Hegel et la rivolution frangaise129 to indicate that Fichte's
"perpetual" terrorism is "a possibility pertaining to the divided reality
of the modern world."' 3 0 This should be taken to state the relation-
ship between appropriative alienation and bourgeois terror. In a sense
it is a summary of what has been discussed largely through Kant.
Hegel himself passed from Kant's formalism, which, as has been
said, masked terror, to the formalism of Fichte, which as Rohrm6ser
said, also masked terror. Hegel wrote:
Now if we abide in these entirely vacant forms, . . . nothing can
then be regarded as of value in itself, that is, essentially and on its
own account. It is exclusively produced by the subjectivity of tlie
Ego. But this being so, it follows that the Ego remains lord and
master over everything. In no sphere of morals or law ... is there
anything at all which would not in the first instance have to be
posited by the Ego, and which consequently could not equally be
nullified by the same agency. This is nothing less than making all
that exists on its own actual and independent warranty a mere sem-
blance, ... a mere show in virtue of the Ego ....
... At the standpoint at which the artist is the Ego, which both
posits and resolves everything through its own essential fiat, for which
no content of consciousness appears as absolute and essentially inde-
pendent, but only as itself a semblance created and destroyable,...
seriousness can find no place, nothing here receiving a right to be
save the formalism of the Ego. 31
Hegel said that the formalism of both Kant and Fichte resulted in
"chill duty."'132
Reference has already been made to the relation between Carl
Schmitt, the Nazi "crown jurist," and the friend/foe social and legal
ideas of Nixon,' the enemy of the "deterrorization" aims of the War-
ren majority of the Supreme Court. W. R. Beyer wrote:
Carl Schmitt, the legal theorist of the fascist period, feigns a certain
remoteness of the content of law, in that he introduces "the decision
129. J. RITTER, HEGEL ET LA RiVOLUTION FRANgAISE (1970).
130. G. ROHRM6SER, Tir .OLOGIE ET ALIENATION DANS LA PENSEE DU JEUNE
HEGEL 85 (1970).
131. 1 G. HEGEL, supra note 9, at 88-90 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
132. 3 G. HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPaY 461 (E. Haldane
& F. Simson transl. 1896).
133. See Franklin, supra note 4.
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as a specific form-element," confirms by an exceptional state of af-
fairs, and relinquishes the monopoly of decision over the totality of
the concrete situation to the "sovereign." The "what of law" passes
back to him. Arbitrariness and terror of the dominant class thus
become concealed. Domination over the situation of conflict acquires
content only through the decision-establishing order with help
founded within the value-bounds of friend/foe theory.'8 4
Beyer thus indicated the Neo-Kantianism of Schmitt. Such "form-
element" or formalism separated from content, veers the content of
law into the nothingness of the semblance of content through the crises
of the presence of Kantian antinomies (Schmitt's "exceptional" situa-
tion); and such agony, tragedy or comedy of the dominant social
force is then mastered by the a priori of legal method, which is a mask
or disguise for its terrorism of the dominated. This is an echo of the
methodology of the terror of certain Roman and of all Anglo-Amer-
ican "equity." In these the hegemony of the terrorizing, mediating force
is established by the polarity or "exceptionalism" of law/equity, actio/
exceptio, justifying the hegemony of the methodology of the jurist or
sovereign, who is now "distanced" and masked from the content of
law and obtains his masked Kantian-existential freedom to be terror-
istic or arbitrary in decision. This is not the methodology of the ninth
amendment or of Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut. There
the "equity" or the force of the content of law itself justifies the
methodological struggle to explode the content itself, to unearth its
possibilities, to identify the particularism of the text with its opposite,
that is, the general force of such text. This "equity" is also Romanist,
but such Romanist equity, which is methodologically grounded in the
content, was virtually unknown in modem Anglo-American law prior
to the ninth amendment and Douglas' opinion in Griswold. Schmitt's
"equity" freed of the content of law ("remoteness"), unleashes terror.
Douglas' "equity," methodologically controlled by the content of law,
"deterrorizes" terror.'2 5
134. Beyer, Rechtsphilosophie, in 2 PHILOSOPHISCHES WbaTERBUcH 916, 919
(7th ed. 1970) (emphasis in original). Hans Schueler in discussing recent work of West
German courts refers to a revival of the influence of Carl Schmitt. Schueler, Die
Sittenwachter der Nation, Die Zeit (Hamburg), March 7, 1975, at 1, col. 2. I am
indebted to Peter R. Engelhardt for sending me this material.
135. See Franklin, A New Conception of the Relation between Law and Equity,
11 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGIcAL RESEARCH 474 (1951); Franklin, Equity in
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It is bourgeois terrorism, which has been more or less actual
for almost two centuries, that the Warren majority opposed and
sought to condemn and overcome by means of the texts of the Bill of
Rights, and by means of the textually disciplined methodological acti-
vism therein released by the ninth amendment. The constitutional
texts derive from the legal Romanism of that side of the French En-
lightenment which, in the presentation by Marx and Engels in The
Holy Family, conceived of the French revolution primarily as masking
a Roman, virtuous superstructure and secondly as an infrastructural
upheaval. It derives from that side of the Enlightenment, the bourgeois
terrorism of which was overcome by the organized, imperialistic bour-
geois terrorism of Napoleon, which ultimately came to represent
bourgeois infrastructuralism. Among American thinkers, Jefferson was
foremost in his understanding of this derivation. The Warren majority
enjoyed this Jeffersonian legacy.
As has been indicated, Marx, in his essay On the Jewish Ques-
tion,130 perceived that it was civil society or the social infrastructure,
and not the superstructure, including the civil liberties and civil rights
of the superstructure, which ultimately determines human freedom.
However, if the bourgeois infrastructure is weak, the bourgeoisie re-
treats or is forced to retreat superstructurally in order to gain social
strength. This it did in the United States through the recognition of
the Bill of Rights. These "amendments" state the historic hegemony
of the second Constitution over the first or Philadelphia Constitution.
The second Constitution was acknowledged by the American bour-
geoisie because of its weak position after the revolution. As has been
said, Mably saw that class struggle existed in the United States when
the English recognized American independence. This writer has
sketched elsewhere the crisis which then obtained in the United
States.'3 7 Perhaps it is not necessary to restate these several weaknesses
here. The influence of these bourgeois fears may, in part, be felt in
Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TUL. L. REv. 485 (1935). It is not necessary to
discuss the place of Aristotle in this presentation of "equity." Aristotle abstractly leads
both to the exploding, "deterrorizing" opinion of Justice Douglas in the Griswold
case and to Carl Schmitt's Kantian terroristic "exceptionalist" "equity," as justified by
his Kantian formalism.
136. Marx, supra note 3, at 216.
137. Franklin, supra note 121,. at 128-30; see THE FEDERALIST, No. 6, at 29
(Modem Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton); id. No. 11, at 69; id. No. 34, at 206;
id. No. 43, at 282-85 (J. Madison).
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The Federalist. It is important to mention, using the veiled language
of La Bruyre found in The Federalist, that the enslaved blacks,
through the alliances that they could make, would determine what,
in effect, was the outcome of class struggle in the United States. The
formulation and acceptance of the second Constitution was imposed
on the more reactionary sector of the American bourgeoisie under
such circumstances. The Warren majority legitimately seized on these
texts in order to "deterrorize" the contemporary bourgeoisie as much
as possible during a social period of bourgeois decline. In so doing, it
weakened the theses of Marcuse and others that there is no realistic
social struggle in this country. The work of the Warren majority
shows not only the presence in the United States of social forces more
or less particularistically hostile to the bourgeoisie, but also the
rivalries and cleavages existing within the American bourgeoisie itself.
This indicates both the aim, deterrorization, and the limits of the aim
of the Warren majority, the preservation of appropriative alienation
without terror. As this is merely a superstructural position, the ques-
tion today is whether the "deterrorization" activism of the Warren
majority can maintain its actuality in view of the Thermidorian
reaction of the Burger court.
IV. DETERRORIZATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The fifth amendment states a problem of deterrorization to which
the Warren majority addressed itself. Perhaps it will be helpful to
reproduce the text itself:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Part of this text seeks to deterrorize criminal law of despotism by "de-
terrorizing" infamy.
WARREN MAJORITY
. The bourgeois theorists of the Enlightenment condemned not only
the terrorism of feudal torture, but also the terrorism of feudal capitis
deminutio and feudal infamia. Both "capital" crime and "infamous"
crimes are conceptions of Roman law. The "capital" crime of the
fifth amendment relates to the degrees of impairment of personality by
capitis deminutio of Roman law. These degrees include not only the
degrees of physical death, but also the degrees of other impairment of
legal or juridical social relations. The "infamous" crimes of the fifth
amendment relate pejoratively to the infamia or infamy of Roman
law. Infamy was a conception of Roman law, the force of which was
to destroy the social relations of the infamed person. Because the hu-
man being is dialectically human only because of the realities or ac-
tualities of his social relations, infamy resulted in living death or liv-
ing nothingness. 138 The terriorism for which Hegel criticized the French
terror was the terrorism of death, including all the manifestations of
death, through the destruction of social relations. Hegel, it will be
recalled, described the victims of terrorism as cabbages or glasses of
water, that is, as human nullities. This terrorism could be justified
if the feudal infrastructure was itself ready to vanish from history,
because new bourgeois possibilities had established their actuality
through revolutionary praxis. If Hegel's presentation is set on its feet
or restated as prose (to quote Marx in another connection), it states
the terrorism hidden in the bourgeois infrastructure. But this is masked
by the bourgeois idea of the rule of law, or of the Rechtsstaat, justi-
fied by Kant's categorical imperative. Hegel's aim was the deterroriza-
tion of bourgeois terrorism after the bourgeois conquest of the state.
Deterrorization is in part stated, so far as the Warren majority is con-
cerned, in the fifth amendment, which, unlike impeachment-infamy
of the executive, forbids state acknowledged infamy, save after grand
jury indictment and petit jury conviction for a textually posited crime.
However, this amendment has not prevented American bourgeois ter-
roristic infamy through congressional and presidential declarations of
infamy. This has been resisted in various ways by the Warren majority
and is one of the marks of its deterrorizing mission.
Although the Warren majority confronted unconstitutionally
imposed infamy, it lacked the cultural strength to give consistently
what was required. This is because infamy is not an Anglo-American
138. See 3.-P. SARTRE, supra note 34.
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common-law conception, but a Romanist conception. Nevertheless Jef-
ferson, Hobbes and Bentham knew the idea of infamy. In 1956, in
Ullman v. United States,139 Justice Douglas said that
[w]hen public opinion casts a person into the outer darkness, as
happens today when a person is exposed as a Communist, the gov-
ernment brings infamy on the head of the witness when it compels
disclosure. That is precisely what the Fifth Amendment prohibits.1 40
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority in the same case, ig-
nored the Romanist conception of the fifth amendment advanced by
Justice Douglas in his dissent. In Watkins v. United States,'4' Chief
Justice Warren said that "[w]e have no doubt that there is no con-
gressional power to expose for the sake of exposure."' 42
It must be emphasized that the deterrorizing activity of the War-
ren majority in relation to the fifth amendment is subject to reproach
because the Court did not acknowledge or consciously know that the
Bill of Rights or second Constitution is not founded merely on Eng-
lish legal history, but is a prdcis of the thought of the European En-
lightenment against feudalism stated in appropriately adapted con-
cepts of Roman law. If the Warren majority did not know this, it
was due to the default of the American law schools, which regard the
Bill of Rights or second Constitution as a text of English legal history.
However, the Mexican constitution indicates not only the deterroriz-
ing force of the fifth amendment, but perfects it by uniting to it what
is contained in the eighth amendment of the American text. The
Mexican text says that
[plunishment by mutilation and infamy, branding, flogging, beating
with sticks, torture of any kind, excessive fines, confiscation of prop-
erty and any other unusual or extreme penalties are prohibited.
Capital punishment for political offenses is likewise prohibit-
ted .... 143
139. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
140. Id. at 454 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
142. Id. at 200.
143. CoNsrruCION tit. I, art. 22 (Mexico, 1917). One commentator has noted
that Mr. Justice Field, in his dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,
337 (1892), forged a similar link between the texts of the fifth and eighth amend-
ments in order constitutionally to determine the novel historical problem raised by the
imposition of excessive terms of imprisonment. Comment, The Eighth Amendment,
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V. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE WARREN MAJORITY
OF THE SUPREME COURT
A large part of the criticism of the Warren majority consists
of a dreary discussion of particular constitutional decisions (though
here there is a serious gap because of the failure to consider the con-
stitutional activity of the court in matters of conflict of laws). This is
not satisfactory. What is required today, relative to the Bill of Rights
or second Constitution, is the dialectic of the unity-in-opposition of
content and form. This means that the content, indeed, is prior; but
it also means that the content is negated, but not separated as in Kant,
by the structure or form that the content necessitates. The form estab-
lished by the text projects the legitimate futurity of the text. The
form is an eruption which develops, generalizes, enriches, and unfet-
ters the content. As indicated, the eruptive dialectic of form and con-
tent is not Kantian formalism or the formalism of American law
school study of legal method, which separates or "doubles" form
and content. On the contrary, both form and content as a dialectical
unity-of-opposites are historical. Each negates its own historic other.
It is appropriate to consider the work of the Warren majority as his-
torical form in order to master its historical fury. Therefore, certain
aspects of the form or of the legal method of the Warren majority
must be brought forward.
The Warren majority was more or less forced to recapture the
bourgeois legal Romanism of the constitutional texts, especially those
of the second Constitution or Bill of Rights. This is a task that the
Court could not accomplish adequately or even self-consciously be-
cause of the hegemony of Anglo-American common law in this coun-
try; but the infrastructural crisis, that is, the infrastructure as sub-
ject, imposed this responsibility on its object, the Warren majority.
Beccaria, and the Enlightenment, 24 BUFFALO LAW REv. 783, (1975). This commentator
wrote that Justice Field, while relying on the language of the eighth amendment
did not rest his argument solely on [that] amendment. He correctly invoked
the fifth amendment which limits the government's ability to infame private
citizens and clearly recognized the interrelationships that pertain among the
amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights. He did not intend to let the
individual amendments or clauses within an amendment be limited or made
impotent by viewing them in splendid isolation. As Justice Field stated, "the
cruelty of it, in this case, by the imprisonment at hard labor, is further in-
creased by the offenses being thus made infamous crimes."
Id. at 794-95 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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The infrastructural crisis is so intense that it drove the Warren ma-
jority to the higher level of a Romanist methodology-a level that
Anglo-American methodology could not produce. Pound had stated
the American-Romanist methodological problem earlier in the century.
The most important accomplishment of the enlightened crypto-
Romanism of the Warren majority was that of Justice Douglas in the
Griswold case, which already has been weakened by the Burger court.
Here the Warren majority acknowledged that the ninth amendment
justified civilly the analogical development of the texts of the second
Constitution. This means that, as in Roman law, the general force of
the texts of the Bill of Rights may erupt through a struggle to negate
the particularism of the original text or group of texts. Charles Black
stated the importance of the Griswold case, which is almost ignored or
inadequately considered by others.14 4 Moreover, the constitutional
text of the guarantee of republican form of government in the first
or Philadelphia Constitution, and the texts of the third or civil war
Constitution, may also be developed by analogy. Perhaps it is correct
to say that the constitutional force of the guarantee of republican form
of government has been both masked and denarcotized by the Warren
majority.
The Warren majority also seems to have been infrastructurally
dominated by the Romanist actio in factum. Such a Romanist action
is exploratory. It may or may not be a legitimate projet of the consti-
tutional text as exploded. Its legitimacy may not yet be acknowledged.
Its legitimacy becomes the concern of academic doctrine, as under-
stood in the history of Roman and civil law. It may or may not be
developed in subsequent history. Buckland, the only classic English-
speaking Romanist, wrote in A Text-Book of Roman Law that
there was nothing utilis, nothing like extension of an existing ac-
tion, in many actiones in factum. There were indeed cases in which
an actio in factum was itself extended as utilis to new cases.145
There is also implicit in the crypto-Romanist activity of the Warren
majority a theory reprobating fraud on the Constitution.
As the Warren majority was in some respects a Romanist cassa-
144. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WAsH. L. Rv.
3, 32-39 (1970).
145. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROmAN LAw FROm AuGuSTUS TO JUS-
TINIAN 687 (1932) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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tional court, its "reasoning" or its own formulations are not always
as important as its determinations as justified ultimately by appro-
priately indicated textual foundations in the Constitution. The work
of the Warren majority may be called cassational insofar as its task
was to "quash" determinations of inferior authorities which were hos-
tile or which may have been hostile to the indicated texts or force of
the second and third Constitutions. This idea develops out of the
power of the Roman plebeian tribunes to veto through their power
of intercessio patrician determinations hostile to plebeians. The
tribunes had no responsibility to justify their negation of patrician
authority. The slave-holder theorist, Calhoun, complained, in effect,
that the Supreme Court, under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, had a tribunitial or cassational power over the state courts. He
said that the provisions of this legislation
provide for appeals only in cases where the decision is adverse to the
power claimed [for the United States], or in favor of that of the
latter [that is, the particular states]. They assume that the courts
of the States are always right when they decide in favor of the gov-
ernment of the United States, and always wrong, when they decide
in favor of the power of their respective States; and, hence, they
provide for an appeal in the latter case, but none in the former.1 46
The cassational power of the Supreme Court had its counter-part,
subsequently, in the French tribunal of cassation of the French revo-
lution. Cassation derives from the intercessio of Roman law and was
understood as legislative activity- 47
Early in his judicial career, Justice Frankfurter raised the ques-
tion of the justification of the role of Anglo-American judicial opin-
ion as such under a formulated constitution. He wrote that "the ulti-
mate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it." 148
There should have arisen within the American faculties of law
a new division of legal labor which would scientifically condemn or
criticize the determinations of the Supreme Court, insofar as these con-
146. J. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the
United States, in 1 THE Woaxs oF JOHN C. CALHOUN 111, 326 (R. Cralle ed. 1854)
(emphasis in original).
147. Franklin, Problems Relating to the Influence of the Roman Idea of the Veto
Power in the History of Law, 22 TUL. L. REv. 443,448-50 (1948).
148. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
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cern the content as such, the content as exploded, the structure, the
methodology, the categories of constitutional activity. This in turn
could inspire the Supreme Court. As the law faculties have not strug-
gled for recognition of this critical power, it has not been acknowl-
edged. On the other hand, the presence both of the texts and of the
role of doctrine (or of learned writing of the law faculties) did de-
velop in the history of Roman law. American legal scholars do not
really offer this criticism because they presuppose the work of the
Supreme Court as a thing-in-itself-and-for-itself and enjoy their aca-
demic role only within limits set by Coke and Anglo-American uncodi-
fled law in general, and within the limits of Anglo-American ideas
of legal method. The relationship between the justices and the facul-
ties of law is based on the idea that the Constitution is not a revolu-
tionary document, influenced by bourgeoisfied Roman law ideas of the
Enlightenment. The existing relationship reflects an idea that the
American revolution was only a national liberation movement, which
therefore continued to consecrate Anglo-American common-law ideas
of stare decisis and of the negation or manipulation of stare decisis
within the framework of Anglo-American common-law ideas.
Certain texts of the Constitution, for instance "due process,"
establish general clauses or standards rather than rules. Pound is the
leading American theorist of legislative technique and of the legal
method which it justified. In the sphere of the standard, which is
prominent in codified law and in formulated constitutions, Anglo-
American legal ideas of consistency or of continuity of determination
should enjoy no decisive role. If this is correct, certain criticism of the
Warren majority, which finds the work of the Warren majority dis-
continuous or chaotic, collapses because the constitutional text, through
general clauses, standards, accordion formulations and Stoic abstract
universals, justifies the veerings of the Warren majority.
However, the Warren majority, like all bourgeois legal institu-
tions, was part of the history of legal ambiguity and the like. The
problem of the role of legal ambiguity or of legal irony is not the
same as the problem of the legal standard or of the Stoic abstract uni-
versal, because in the sphere of the latter the formulated law itself
requires and justifies individualized determination. The problem of
ambiguity, which Heidegger held was always buried in historical
determinations, has been brought forward earlier in this paper. Kantian
agility has also been mentioned in this connection. But the problem
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of the justification of legal arbitrariness was presented before Kant
and has assumed many forms since Kant. Justice Frankfurter's Lebens-
philosophie or philosophy of life, an ancestor of contemporary exis-
tentialism, has been mentioned. In juridical Lebensphilosophie an
hierarchical supremacy is attributed to the American judge. As has
been suggested, this supremacy is justified because the judge enjoys
the Kantian role of the aesthetic or "beautiful soul," described by
Hegel in The Phenomenology of Mind.149 The American judge is
peculiarly a "beautiful soul," because he incarnates legal method(s).
The "beautiful soul" abstains, withdraws or distances itself. But this
distancing is a form of appropriative alienation involving bourgeois
terror. Nietzsche justified the so-called "pathos of distance." This
sanctified the choices or possibilities of the "beautiful soul," the ex-
ternal or distanced mediator who masks his historical relation to an
historical infrastructure. Norberto Bobbio, the Italian jurist, stated the
identity of the "beautiful soul" or distanced, external mediator, with
the "violence" of Nietzsche.150
However, the chief American juridical theorist of ambiguity or
Verstellung has been Pound. Pound's idea of balance of interest (which
seems to owe something to John Adams' conception of balance of
Montesquieuan powers) justified the external mediation of the jurist
who selects among the possibilities offered by limited, opposed in-
terests. This necessitates the elite position of the judge, or rather of
the legal method of the judge. In his dissent in Wilkinson v. United
States, Justice Black said
that the balancing test, at least as applied to date, means that the
Committee may engage in any inquiry a majority of this Court hap-
pens to think could possibly be for a legitimate purpose .... And
under the tests of legitimacy that are used in this area, any first-
year law school student worth his salt could construct a rationaliza-
tion .... 151
Here again reference may be made to the Griswold case. 52 The opin-
ion of Justice Douglas through which the general civil textual force
of the second Constitution explodes or erupts is free of Verstellung
149. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 664.
150. N. BOBBIO, INTRODUZIONE ALLA FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 104 (1948).
151. 365 U.S. 399,420-21 (1961).
152. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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or irony because it is founded on the formulated Constitution, either
through the analogy of a single constitutional text (Gesetzesanalogie)
or of a group of constitutional texts (Rechtsanalogie). Through strug-
gle it justifies legal development and als6 preserves the 18th-century
origin of the text, which it also dialectically negates. The critics of
the Warren majority have not understood the importance of this tex-
tual unfolding of the Constitution, which, as has been said, also ap-
pears in the history of the formulation of the text of the Uniform
Commercial Code. This may be called the lex Llewellyn.
In its own way the Warren majority attempted to justify the
theory of the three Constitutions, as suggested in this essay. Because
the academic critics of the Warren majority apparently conceive that
the three Constitutions were formulated at one historical moment, they
may deny certain texts-the second and third Constitutions and the
guarantee of republican form of government in the first constitution
-are privileged. To these "sheltered" texts may be added the sacro-
sanct impeachment power of the Congress.
VI. THE WARREN MAJORITY AS A BOURGEOIS MAJORITY
Although the mission of the Warren court was that of attempting
to deterrorize bourgeois social relations, it was nevertheless a consis-
tently bourgeois court. It maintained bourgeois appropriative, infra-
structural alienation, attempting at the same time to purge terror from
this alienation. Indeed, it strengthened bourgeois appropriative aliena-
tion in its policy of deterrorizing appropriative alienation. Hegel and
Marx showed that the basic alienation or seizure was that of work,
and that language, too, is appropriated. As the appropriative aliena-
tion of language reflects the alienation of labor, legal activity also
derives its meaning from the struggle to alienate, or to prevent the
alienation of, posited constitutional formulations ("meaning,' u1 3 "in-
terplay of . . . forces"' 54). Though the Warren majority defended the
integrity of the constitutional texts, especially of the second and third
Constitutions, it did not sincerely relate this struggle to the genuine
social infrastructure.
153. G. HEGEL, supra note 7, at 213.
154. Id. at 186.
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The content of the determinations of the Warren majority essen-
tially justifies appropriative, infrastructural alienation, provided the
problem of bourgeois terrorism is not unveiled. Of course the ma-
terials brought forward in this essay suggest that appropriative aliena-
tion and bourgeois terrorism cannot permanently be separated under
capitalism. But this, of course, was not the thesis of the Warren ma-
jority.
In Hanson v. Denckla,155 Chief Justice Warren protected the
vital interests of late capitalism. This was a problem of conflict of
laws. Much simplified, the question was whether the law of the corpo-
rate trustee or the law of the beneficiaries should determine the case.
The Chief Justice held that the law of the corporate trustee controlled.
In effect he created an alienating relation of domination and sub-
ordination between the latter-day capitalist and the so-called benefi-
ciaries. This was correctly condemned by Justice Douglas who per-
ceived that, despite Anglo-American feudal-bourgeois legal concep-
tions of trustee and beneficiary, the trustee was "purely and simply a
stakeholder or an agent.... ."151 Here Justice Douglas' thinking is in-
teresting in that he realized that the problem of the trust was the prob-
lem of the mask, which has been so prominent in this essay as a gen-
eral bourgeois phenomenon. The problem of the trust is really what
may be called in Roman law a problem of simulation, or, particu-
larly here, a problem of interposed person. The Anglo-American
corporate trustee, who is the legal "owner," is discovered to be in truth
the corporate representative and not the corporate master of the benefi-
ciary. Moreover, Justice Douglas realized that the economic power of
domination or alienation concentrated by the Chief Justice in the
corporate "representative" reflects the contemporary situation, in gen-
eral, in which, for the sake of late capitalism, "volitional" relations
may overcome earlier bourgeois "property" relations.
Furthermore, the Chief Justice in Hanson v. Denckla said that
"it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws."' 57 He justified appropriative alienation in this case,
155. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
156. Id. at 263.
157. Id. at 253.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
not only in terms of a suppletive or alienation idea of litis contestatio
or of "volitional" consent to the competence of state power, but also
in terms of "bargain"'158 consideration of Anglo-American contract
law, which developed in response to bourgeois appropriation or aliena-
tion of surplus-value. Detriment consideration has come to mean
bargain in the sense of a reciprocally inspired "volitional" transac-
tion of interest in bourgeois society. What has happened is that the
idea of feudal delictal consideration has come to mean alienating
bourgeois "bargain" consideration. The Chief Justice made this "bar-
gain" consideration the criterion of judicial competence within the
sphere of conflict of laws, a sphere of the greatest importance to the
latter-day American bourgeoisie.
The general constitutional law of conflict of laws, as it developed
under the Warren majority, may conceal new alienation require-
ments of the late bourgeoisie. To the late bourgeoisie, choice of law
or choice of competence based on apparent political boundaries of
sovereigns may have become unsuitable. If so, Kantian semblance and
Kantian formalism may here emerge. The instances of Hitler's racial
invasions, the Suez crisis, the American invasion of Vietnam, Ford's
and Kissinger's. threats to the oil lands of Arab states, intrusion in
Chile, and elsewhere come to mind. Carl Schmitt, the Nazi "crown
jurist," developed a theory of boundaries based on existentialism and
determined by the existentialist sovereign to justify the negation of
historically posited boundaries as illusory boundaries. Part of the
Warren majority may have created a theory of boundaries of Amer-
ican states which recognizes existential boundaries or anthropological
boundaries, not positive ones, in order to create, when required, new
bourgeois bases for choice of law and for choice of competences. This
may reflect the interest in appropriative alienation of the late bour-
geoisie, though it may be given the mask or incognito or semblance of
bourgeois social or national welfare theory, and thus may in truth be
passed off as the opposite of what it is.
This may indicate, perhaps, the limits of the deterrorization of
alienation sought by part of the Warren majority. The scope and
limits of its deterrorization of alienation or appropriation seem set by
the texts of the second and third Constitutions, further developed by
the civil possibilities of the explosive force of the Griswold case and
158. See Marx, supra note 2, at 243, 244.
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of the ninth amendment, unless these texts and their analogies con-
front the existential claims of the late bourgeoisie. In their discus-
sions of the Warren majority, Bickel and Kurland invoke the role of
Justice Frankfurter, who, as an opponent within the Warren court,
condemned the Warren majority. Justice Frankfurter's thinking, which
it is customary to relate to that of his predecessor, Justice Holmes,
shows, as has been said, the influence of 19th-century philosophy of
life-one of the irrational bourgeois currents of thought which
emerged during the history of the late bourgeoisie. Today philosophy
of life, as developed under the subsequent influence or outcome of
Husserl, appears in more refined form as existentialism.
It may be feared by existentialist theorists of law that the sem-
blance of bourgeois social welfare in the hidden alienation theory of
part of the Warren majority may, in conflict of laws, be not sem-
blance, but genuine, as it truly was on constitutionally justified grounds
with Justices Black and Douglas. If this is correct, it may be that
criticism of the Warren majority will be aimed against both the de-
terrorization ideas of the Warren majority and the fear that the bour-
geois social welfare theory of part of the Warren majority would not
be merely the semblance of such bourgeois social welfare but genu-
ine bourgeois social welfare theory. This becomes a matter of con-
frontation and struggle to maintain the relatively limited social ac-
complishments of the majority of the Warren court.

